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The beef and dairy industries are very important to the U.S. economy.  Currently the U.S. 
is the world’s largest beef producer, with over 10.5 million head of cattle in feedlots 
(NASS, 2010).  In 2009, the beef industry produced over 26.5 billion pounds of beef 
while the dairy industry produced over 189.2 billion pounds of milk (USDA, 2010).  
Understanding both supply and demand issues is vital in these industries.   
 This study seeks to address both production and demand issues in the bovine 
industry.  This study consists of three essays on two main topics important to the bovine 
industries. The first paper analyzes the economic effects of bovine respiratory disease in 
feedlot cattle and the second two papers are based on a nationwide survey on consumers’ 
preferences for animal cloning. 
 Bovine respiratory disease (BRD) can cause significant economic losses for cattle 
producers.   The disease causes between $800-900 million annually in economic losses 
including death losses, reduced feed efficiency, and treatment costs (Chirase and Greene, 
2001).  Although medical costs attributable to the treatment of BRD are substantial, the 




likely even more devastating. This research assesses the economic effects of BRD in 
backgrounding and finishing phases with risk assessment of calves based on serum 
haptoglobin (Hp). Cross -bred heifers with expected high-risk of BRD (n=337) were 
assembled at a Kentucky order buyer facility and delivered to Stillwater, OK in 
September 2007.  Heifers were assigned pens by risk-group according to arrival Hp 
concentration: Low (serum Hp < 1.0 mg/dL), Medium (1.0 mg/dL < serum Hp < 3.0 
mg/dL), and High (serum Hp > 3.0 mg/dL). They were monitored daily for signs of BRD 
in a 63 day backgrounding phase. After backgrounding, heifers (n=193) were allocated to 
finishing pens based on number of BRD treatments received: never treated (0X; n = 54), 
treated once (1X; n = 54), treated twice (2X; n = 34), treated three times (3X; n = 39), 
and chronically ill (CX; n = 12). Hp concentration had no significant effect on net returns 
(P ≥ 0.50) and was not significantly different across number of BRD treatments (P ≥ 
0.11).  However, net returns decreased in the backgrounding phase (P < 0.0001) and the 
combined backgrounding-finishing phases (P = 0.001) as number of BRD treatments 
increased. On average, 0X, 1X, 2X, and 3X groups had $111.12, $92.51, $59.98, and 
$20.62, respectively, higher net returns than CX (P < 0.0001) during backgrounding. 
When combining phases, 3X and CX groups lost $72.01 and $143.20 more than 0X 
group (P ≤ 0.03). 
 Interest among farmers, food retailers, and regulators regarding market impacts of 
the introduction of milk from clones was prompted after the FDA’s recent statement that 
products from cloned animal and their offspring were safe to consume.  To address 
consumers’ preferences for animal cloning, a nationwide survey was administered in the 




perceptions about animal cloning along with their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for products 
resulting from cloned animals or their offspring.  
 Because milk from cloned animals is not currently labeled in the market, the first 
paper utilized a stated preference experiment to determine consumer preferences for the 
attribute, but also sought to determine whether the survey-based choices were consistent 
with people’s revealed preferences given by scanner data.  Our analysis indicates that a 
pooled model combining stated and revealed preference data exhibits overall better out-
of-sample prediction performance than either data set used alone.  Results from the 
pooled model indicate consumers are willing to pay large premiums to avoid milk from 
cloned cows – an amount that is over three times that for organic or rBST-free milk. The 
results are used to calculate the value of a mandatory labeling program. 
 Based on the premise that consumers’ preferences are context-independent, data 
on people’s private shopping choices are often used to draw implications about their 
desires for food policies. The purpose of the final paper is to test this, often implicit, 
assumption using data from a nationwide survey about animal cloning.  We find that 
although people’s private choices indicate a strong desire to avoid meat and milk from 
cloned cattle, implying a significant willingness-to-pay to ban food from cloned animals, 
that when directly asked, most people oppose a ban and would demand compensation 
through lower food prices were a ban enacted.  The results suggest caution in inferring 








ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF BOVINE RESPIRATORY DISEASE ON FEEDLOT 
CATTLE DURING BACKGROUNDING AND FINISHING PHASES 
 
Introduction 
Bovine respiratory disease (BRD) is the most common disease among feedlot cattle in 
the United States.  It accounts for approximately 75% of feedlot morbidity and 50 to 70% 
of all feedlot deaths (Edwards, 1996; Galyean, Perino, and Duff, 1999; Loneragan et al., 
2001).  The majority of deaths due to BRD occur shortly after arrival to the feedlot or 
within the first 45 days (Edwards, 1996; Loneragan et al., 2001).  In fact, Buhman et al. 
(2000) reported approximately 91% of calves diagnosed with BRD were diagnosed 
within the first 27 days after arrival.  BRD causes an estimated $800-$900 million in 
economic losses annually to the U.S. beef cattle industry from death, reduced feed 
efficiency, and treatment costs (Chirase and Greene, 2001).   
 Medical costs attributable to the treatment of BRD are substantial, and the 
economic impacts of BRD on carcass merit and meat quality further increase the 
economic costs. Gardner et al. (1999) found steers with lung lesions plus active lymph 
nodes had $73.78 lower net returns.  Medicine costs accounted for 21% of the decrease 




(24.7% more USDA Standard quality grade carcasses). BRD can also cause economic 
losses due to decreased gain and carcass values (Duff and Galyean, 2007).  A Texas 
Ranch-to-Rail study found BRD morbidity accounted for 8% higher production costs, not 
including losses related to decreased performance (Griffin, Perino, and Wittum, 1995). 
Griffin, Perino, and Wittum (1995) observed cattle with BRD had a 3% decrease in gain 
compared with healthy cattle and cost the program $111.38 per sick animal. Snowder et 
al. (2006) estimated economic losses in a 1000 head feedlot from BRD infection due to 
lower gains and treatment costs to be approximately $13.90 per animal. 
 Demand for higher quality products and increased value-based marketing have 
heightened beef producers’ awareness of health management practices with potential to 
increase profitability and beef product quality.  Feedlot producers able to purchase calves 
that are more likely to remain healthy during the feeding period could potentially increase 
profits through reduced costs and higher revenues. Previous studies document the 
economic impact from BRD in either backgrounding or finishing programs. The majority 
of those studies are from animal scientists and veterinarians.  Current research relating to 
animal disease in agricultural economics journals deals with major outbreaks of 
infectious diseases (e.g. bovine spongiform encephalopathy or bovine brucellosis), 
tracking systems, and eradication programs (Amosson et al., 1981; Elbakidze, 2007; 
Hennessy, Rossen, and Jensen, 2005; Kuchler and Hamm, 2000).  Limited research on 
BRD in feedlot cattle is reported in agricultural economic journals. Nyamusika et al. 
(1994) however, using a stochastic simulation model of BRD, found significant returns to 
vaccination of cattle. The simulation found vaccination programs combined with 




effects of BRD in the backgrounding phase is warranted along with the effects in the 
finishing phase and the phases combined. 
 Knowing the economic impact of BRD on both backgrounding and finishing 
phases is important. A tool that enables producers to determine whether animals will 
remain healthy could potentially increase producers’ profits. Serum haptoglobin (Hp) 
concentration has been suggested as a tool for making management decisions based on 
data that shows cattle requiring treatment for BRD had a higher Hp concentration upon 
arrival than calves that remained healthy throughout the preconditioning phase (Berry et 
al., 2004; Carter et al., 2002). Hp is an acute-phase protein produced by the liver in 
response to cellular injury. Based upon Hp concentration measured at arrival, producers 
could potentially determine animals that would remain healthy.  
 The overall objective of this research was to determine the economic effects of 
BRD on backgrounding and finishing phases individually, as well as the two phases 
combined for the same cattle.  In addition, this research measures the effectiveness of 
using serum haptoglobin concentration to predict BRD occurrence and the economic 
impact of multiple treatments for BRD in backgrounding on both backgrounding and 
cattle feeding performance. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Cattle producers are assumed to maximize expected profits. The question is whether the 
use of serum Hp concentration to predict BRD occurrence has an effect on those expected 
profits and whether multiple treatments for BRD affect the returns on infected cattle. 






  ′ 
where E	
 is the expected net revenue per head from their operation,  s the vector of 
output prices, ris the vector of input prices, 
 is the final weight of cattle produced, 
and x is the vector of inputs. 
 Equation (2.1) does not consider the Hp risk group.  Cattle producers would want 
to maximize expected net returns subject to costs and the Hp risk group. Producers could 
test serum Hp prior to purchasing calves to estimate their Hp risk group, considered to be 
low, medium, and high risk in this research. Equation (1) then becomes: 
(2.2) max, E	
  max′
  ′  1, 2, 3 
where E(	) is expected net returns per head from the operation,  is the vector of 
expected prices for risk group v (v=1, 2, 3), r is the vector of input prices, 
 is the 
final weight or number of cattle produced in risk group v, and x is the vector of inputs for 
risk group v.  The producer would then be maximizing net returns per head.   
 
Materials and Methods 
Backgrounding Phase 
The current research was conducted according to Oklahoma State University Animal 
Care and Use Committee approved protocol (#AG-07-14).  For this study, 337 cross-bred 
heifers were purchased by Eastern Livestock order buyers and assembled at the West 
Kentucky Livestock Market, Marion, KY in September 2007.  Heifers were processed 
after arrival to Stillwater, OK on September 12 and 14 (day 0) and assigned pens by risk-
group according to Hp concentration: Low (serum Hp < 1.0 mg/dL), Medium (1.0 mg/dL 




(25.52%) were in the low-risk group, 98 (29.08%) were in the medium-risk group, and 
153 (45.40%) were in the high-risk group.  Heifers were fed twice daily, ad libitum, a 
65% concentrate receiving/growing ration during the 63-day backgrounding phase 
costing $111.87 per ton as fed. Specific details regarding rations, animal management, 
and experimental procedures are described by Holland et al. (2010).    
Heifers were evaluated daily for signs of BRD according to standard facility 
protocol (Step et al., 2008) in which animals were assigned a clinical attitude score (CAS; 
1 – 4) based on depression, appetite, and respiratory signs. Antimicrobial therapy was 
administered when CAS was 1 (mild) or 2 (moderate) and rectal temperature was ≥ 40° 
C, or when CAS was 3 (severe) or 4 (moribund), regardless of temperature. First 
treatment was 10 mg tilmicosin/kg of bodyweight (BW) costing $1.0814/mg (Micotil 
300, Elanco Animal Health, Greenfield, IN), second treatment was 10 mg 
enrofloxacin/kg of BW costing $0.59/mg (Baytril 100, Bayer Animal Health, Shawnee 
Mission, KS), and third treatment was two doses of 2.2 mg ceftiofur/kg of BW costing 
$0.0742/mg (Excenel,  Pharmacia & UpJohn, New York, NY) administered 48-h apart. A 
$0.50 chute charge was added when animals were administered treatments.  Chronically 
ill animals were removed from home pens on or after day 21.  Conditions necessary to be 
classified as chronically ill were: 1) received all three antimicrobial therapies according 
to protocol; 2) on feed more than 21 days ; 3) experienced a net loss of BW over the 
preceding 21 days on feed; and 4) they were assigned a BRD severity of ≥3.  
 Table II-1 shows the number of BRD treatments given to heifers across the Hp 
risk groups. Of the 337 heifers, there were a total of 113 never treated (33.53%), 98 




classified as chronically ill (3.56%), and 29 mortalities (8.61%) during the backgrounding 
phase. High mortality may be attributed to the use of high-risk cattle.  The heifers in the 
study were most likely weaned immediately prior to transporting to the auction market, 
where they were commingled and then shipped to the feedlot and appeared stressed upon 
arrival. 
 Heifers were individually weighed on days 0, 7, 14, 21, 42, and 63. Production 
data included average daily gain (ADG) during the 63-day backgrounding phase, feed 
intake and costs, vaccination costs, gain to feed (G:F), Hp risk group, number of BRD 
treatments, and cost of BRD treatments. Because animals were pen fed, feed intake of 
individual animals could not be directly measured during the preconditioning phase. 
Intake was calculated based on ADG and energy density of the diet using net energy 
equations (NRC, 2000).  Feed intake for mortalities was calculated based on the average 
feed intake per day from animals that lived times the number of days the dead animal was 
on the trial. ADG for mortalities was the last recorded weight minus their initial weight 
divided by the number of days they were on trial. Preconditioning costs included 
vaccination costs and costs of treatment of eye or other infections.  Heifers were 
vaccinated in the preconditioning phase against infectious bovine herpesvirus-1, bovine 
viral diarrhea virus (Types I and II), bovine parainfluenza-3, and bovine respiratory 
syncytial virus costing $1.72 per calf (Pyramid 5, Fort Dodge Animal Health, Overland 
Park, KS), and clostridial pathogens costing $0.75 per calf (Vision 7 with Spur, 
Intervet/Schering-Plough Animal Health, DeSoto, KS), deworming with moxidectin 
costing $0.055/mL (Cydectin, Fort Dodge Animal Health), and implanting with estradiol 




Heifers were treated with long-acting oxytetracycline costing $0.0742/mL (Bio-Mycin 
200, Boerhinger-Ingelheim, Ingelheim am Rhein, Germany). 
The initial and day 63 prices were estimated using USDA Agricultural Marketing 
Services (AMS) feeder cattle weighted-average sale data from the Oklahoma National 
Stockyards (Oklahoma City, OK).  Prices used were from the weeks of arrival and day 
63, with adjustments for weights (KO_LS795 for week of 9/12/2007 and 11/14/2007).  
An ordinary least squares regression for price as a function of the number of head sold 
per pen, average weight per pen, weight squared, and grade was estimated for both arrival 
price and day 63 price using the AMS data.   
 
Finishing phase 
After the backgrounding phase (63 days), heifers were allocated to finishing pens based 
on the number of times they were treated for BRD. The classification of groups were: 
never treated (0X), treated once (1X), treated twice (2X), treated three times (3X), and 
identified as chronically ill (CX). Initial classification based on arrival serum Hp was 
disregarded in the finishing phase. If treatment protocol was not followed in the 
backgrounding phase (n=5) or the animal was lame (n=1), they were not included in the 
finishing phase. Heifers that qualified from 2X (n=34), 3X (n=39), and CX (n=12) groups 
were used in the finishing phase. 54 heifers for 0X and 1X groups were chosen for the 
finishing phase so that a similar day 63 BW between the selected heifers and the total 
number of heifers in that group were maintained.   Cattle were fed according to standard 
procedure at the facility and weighed every 28 days.  Three diets with increasing 




finishing diet, costing $207.11 per ton as fed.  Further information on finishing phase 
procedures and rations are outlined in Holland et al. (2010).  
Finishing phase production data included ADG, feed intake and cost, vaccination 
costs, G:F, and total days on feed. Feed intake in the finishing phase per animal was 
calculated using as fed pounds per day per pen divided by the number of head in the pen.  
Heifers were harvested in three groups at the end of the feedlot phase on April 21, May 
13, or May 28, 2008 (152, 174, or 189 d on feed, respectively). Harvest dates were based 
on ADG and estimated carcass characteristics using ultrasound. Heifers were slaughtered 
when they were finished sufficiently to be expected to grade US choice. All CX group 
heifers were harvested on the final date (189 days on feed). Carcass data included 
marbling, yield grade (YG), hot carcass weight (HCW), and back fat measurement.  
Heifers were priced on a commonly used industry grid from the commercial packing 
plant where they were slaughtered. Estimated prices were also calculated using 
alternative grid premiums and discounts based on AMS data (LM_CT155), but were not 
found to be significantly different from the packing plant’s grid prices (National Weekly 
Direct Slaughter Cattle-Premiums and Discounts for the weeks of: 4/21/2008, 5/12/2008, 
and 5/26/2008, respectively).  The grid premiums and discounts used are included in 
Table II-2. 
During the finishing phase, two heifers were treated for signs of BRD. One heifer 
was from the 2X group and remained in her home pen throughout the duration of the 
finishing phase. The other heifer was in the CX group and died.  Three more animals died 




were not included in final statistics because of incomplete carcass data, two heifers each 
from 2X and 3X groups. 
Data were used to determine the effects of Hp risk groups for BRD, treatment of 
sick animals, and the risk-treatment interaction on net returns, costs, and animal 
performance for the backgrounding phase, finishing phase, and backgrounding and 
finishing phases combined1.   
 
Economic Analysis 
The performance and net return differences across risk groups and number of BRD 
treatments were analyzed using LS Means and the following model: 
(2.3)      ∑ !	"!#!$%  ∑ &'('  ∑ ∑ !'	"!)'$%#!$%)'$% (' 
where  is the independent performance measure, 	"! is the risk group i (i = low, 
medium, high), and (' is the number of BRD treatments j (j = 0, 1, 2, 3). Significant 
differences across means were tested using t-tests. Performance measures included ADG, 
G:F, feed costs, day 63 weight, and number of BRD treatments for the backgrounding, 
finishing, and the phases combined.  Carcass measures included HCW, marbling score, 
and YG. Net returns for the backgrounding, finishing, and the two phases combined were 
also analyzed. Final live weights for cattle were taken at the feed yard on the day prior to 
slaughter and were used for finishing phase gain calculations. 
 The most important factors affecting net returns were also determined. Of interest 
are the relative effects of each regressor on net returns defined as:  
(2.4) E	'!
  &'  &'%*%  &'#*#  +  &',*, -'! 
                                                          





 is the net returns per head to be estimated, &′. are the estimated 
standardized betas, and the *! are the variables used for the standardized betas, where i 
represents the individual heifer, j represents either the backgrounding phase, the finishing 
phase, or the total, and, -'! is the residual error term. 
 The units of the variables in equation (2.4) are different; therefore, the magnitudes 
of the individual regression coefficients cannot be directly compared. In order to compare 
the relative importance of the independent variables, they were normalized to have a 
mean of zero and a variance of one. Regressing these variables on the normalized net 
returns yields standardized beta coefficients (SBC). SBCs were calculated from a 
regression model to determine the influence of each variable on net returns. SBCs were 
calculated for net returns using the following model: 
(2.5) 
/01/0222234  ∑ &!5! 617386  9 
where NR is the net revenue, : is the standard deviation, *! is the ith independent variable 
of interest, and &!5 is the SBC for the ith independent variable.  The new coefficients are 
calculated: 
(2.6) &!5  &! 38634 . 
The SBCs are proportions and the absolute value can therefore be used to rank the 
relative importance of the independent variables. Coefficients are interpreted such that if 
*% increases by one standard deviation, then Y changes by &%5 standard deviations 
(Wooldridge, 2006).  
 The variables for the backgrounding phase included initial BW, ADG, G:F, BRD 




treatments. Variables for the finishing phase included initial finishing phase BW, G:F, 
feed costs on an as fed basis, HCW, marbling score, YG, Hp risk group, and number of 
BRD treatments. The combined phase included IBW, ADG for the entire trial, G:F, BRD 
treatment costs, total feed costs on an as fed basis, HCW, marbling score, YG, Hp risk 
group, and number of BRD treatments.  
 Net returns were calculated for the backgrounding phase as transfer revenue/cost 
less purchase cost of the calves, BRD treatment costs, vaccination costs, and feed costs in 
the backgrounding phase. Transfer revenue/cost is the day 63 price that is used as the 
revenue for the backgrounding phase and the initial cost in the finishing phase.  
Vaccination costs varied depending on the initial BW of the animals. Of all BRD 
treatment costs, 99.7% were incurred during the 63-day backgrounding phase and a chute 
charge of $0.50 for the first treatment as added to the respiratory treatment costs to 
account for processing animals. Two heifers were treated for BRD during the finishing 
phase.  
Average net returns for backgrounding, finishing, and combined phases can be 
found in Table II-3.  The net returns for the finishing phase were calculated by 
subtracting transfer revenue/cost, vaccination costs, and feed costs for the finishing phase 
from ending revenue. The total net returns was calculated by subtracting placement cost, 
all vaccination costs, feed costs, and BRD treatment costs from ending revenue.  The 
transfer revenue/cost was defined as $/head at the end of the backgrounding phase and 
the beginning of the finishing phase. Ending revenue is $/head based on grid prices.  All 





Results and Discussion 
Hp Risk Group 
Least squares means by Hp risk group are in Table II-3. No significant differences were 
found across risk group for any of the net returns. However, the low-risk group was 
different (P = 0.03) than the high-risk group for marbling score. Low and high-risk 
groups were different (P ≤ 0.001) than the medium-risk group for backgrounding cost of 
gain.  Out of 89 heifers in the medium risk group, 4 had negative ADGs leading to the 
inflated cost of gain.  There was still a tendency for lower COG in the medium risk group 
compared to the high and low risk groups when these negative ADG were accounted for.  
Hp risk group was not different (P ≥ 0.11) across the number of BRD treatments. Step et 
al. (2008) also observed Hp concentration upon arrival was unrelated to severity of the 
case or the need for treatment in feedlot cattle. However, Hp has been shown to have 
some value in assessing treatment efficacy (Berry et al., 2004; Carter et al., 2002; Wittum 
et al., 1996). Berry et al. (2004) and Carter et al. (2002) observed that upon arrival Hp 
concentration was elevated for calves treated for BRD compared to animals that were not 
treated. Berry et al (2004) showed high correlations between the number of treatments 
and d 0 and d 7 Hp concentrations. Further research needs to be conducted to determine 
the usefulness of serum Hp as a predictor for BRD in feedlot cattle, especially in light of 
its cost.  
 
BRD Treatments 
 Backgrounding Phase. Least squares means by the number of BRD treatments 




across all treatment groups. On average, 0X heifers had $111.12 higher net returns 
compared to CX heifers (P < 0.0001). Heifers in 1X, 2X, and 3X groups had $92.51, 
$59.98, and $20.62, respectively, higher net returns than CX (P < 0.0001).  Similar 
findings have shown calves never treated for BRD had significantly higher returns than 
calves treated once or more than once (Fulton et al., 2002).  
 Beginning BW for cattle in the backgrounding phase was not different (P ≥ 0.51) 
across BRD treatments. However, weights at the end of backgrounding and the start of 
finishing were different (P < 0.0001) across all treatment groups. 3X and CX groups had 
lower (P < 0.0001) ADG compared to 0X, 1X and 2X groups. The CX group gained 0.98 
kg/d, 0.84 kg/d, and 0.56 kg/d less than heifers in 0X, 1X, and 2X groups during the 
backgrounding phase (P < 0.002). Buhman et al. (2000) also reported sick heifer calves 
had lower mean daily gain when compared to those not sick or not removed for 
treatment. Other studies have also reported increased ADG for steers never treated 
compared to those treated once or more than once (Gardner et al., 1999; Wittum and 
Perino, 1995). BRD treatment costs increased (P < 0.0001) as the number of treatments 
increased. The 1X group averaged $9.63 per head more than 0X treatment group (P < 
0.001). 3X and CX groups were not different (P = 0.81) but were different (P < 0.0001) 
than 0X group with treatment costs over $35 per head more. BRD treatment costs have 
been shown to range from zero to $21.70 per head (Edwards, 1996; Fulton et al., 2002). 
Cost of gain also increased as the number of BRD treatments increased (P < 0.002) 





 Finishing Phase. Net returns in the finishing phase were not different (P = 0.07) 
across treatment groups. This may be attributed to the fact that most of the negative 
effects due to health were realized in the backgrounding phase and not carried through to 
the finishing phase.  All but one heifer (99%) treated for BRD was treated during the 
backgrounding phase. Buhman et al. (2000) reported 91% of BRD occurrence was within 
the first 27 days after arrival while Babcock et al. (2008) observed 74% of BRD cases 
occurred within the first 42 day.  
 Initial BW in the finishing phase was different (P < 0.0001) across BRD 
treatments. Heifers in 3X and CX groups weighed 47.69 kg and 70.51 kg more, 
respectively, than 0X group when entering the finishing phase (P < 0.0001). ADG across 
BRD treatments was not different (P = 0.36) during the finishing phase. CX group was 
different (P = 0.05) than 0X group for G:F and cost of gain.  0X heifers were 17% more 
efficient than CX heifers. G:F was approximately 0.11 kg per kg of feed for heifers with 
three or less treatments.  CX heifers cost $0.29 per kg of gain less than 0X group (P = 
0.05). Heifers in 1X, 2X, and 3X groups did not have difference (P ≥ 0.06) in cost of gain 
compared to 0X group with cost of gain over $2.05 per kg of gain for the groups. CX 
heifers tended to improve in efficiency during the finishing phase. However, CX heifers 
had significantly (P = 0.02) lower HCW than 0X heifers (319.78 kg and 343.23 kg, 
respectively).  There were no differences (P = 0.30) across treatment groups for marbling 
score. 3X group had lower (P = 0.05) YG than 0X group (2.94 and 3.35, respectively). 
 
 Combined Backgrounding & Finishing Phase.  In combining the backgrounding 




groups compared to the 0X group for net returns. Figure II-1 shows net returns across the 
number of BRD treatments for all three phases. Heifers in 3X and CX groups never 
seemed to catch up in terms of net returns. Those in 3X and CX groups lost $72.01 and 
$143.20 more than 0X group when combining phases. The majority of the loss was 
during the backgrounding phase where CX heifers lost $111.12 more compared to 0X 
treatment. Heifers in 1X or 2X groups that were treated properly during the 
backgrounding phase saw no significant differences during the combined phase.  
Previous research showed similar results (Edwards, 1996; Fulton et al., 2002).  
 No significant differences (P ≥ 0.327) were observed for DOF in the finishing 
phase between OX, 1X, and 2X groups.  3X and CX were on feed approximately 13 days 
longer than OX group (P = 0.01 and P = 0.05, respectively).  All CX group were 
harvested on the final date (189-d on feed).  When adjusting for animals that died in CX 
group (n=2) then 0X group was on feed 30 days less than CX group.  ADG, when 
combining backgrounding and finishing phases, was different (P = 0.001) between 0X 
and CX groups (1.42 kg/d and 1.19 kg/d, respectively). Buhman et al. (2000) reported 
sick calves to have lower ADG in the first 62 d after arrival compared to those never 
treated and the reduction in ADG continued throughout the remaining feedlot period. 
During the backgrounding phase in the current study, differences in ADG between 0X, 
1X, and 2X were observed, but no differences were found during finishing or when 
phases were combined. The majority of the BRD incidence occurred during the 
backgrounding phase. Early detection and proper treatment could contribute to the calf’s 




compensatory gain was evident in the feedlot after proper treatment of BRD (Snowder et 
al., 2006).  
 Figure II-2 shows the cost of gain across the number of BRD treatments for all 
three phases. During the backgrounding phase, there was over a $1 difference for cost of 
gain among heifers, but there were no differences (P ≥ 0.06) in the finishing phase. Once 
both phases were combined only slight differences in cost of gain were observed. One of 
the main costs in the backgrounding phase is the BRD treatment costs. When these costs 
are distributed across the combined phase, the increased gain offsets the effect from BRD 
treatment costs.  
 The current study observed heifers in 3X and CX treatment groups tend to “catch-
up” in terms of physical measures after early detection and proper treatement once they 
are in the finishing phase, but the negative impact on overall net returns continues.  Those 
heifers in the 3X and CX treatment groups had longer DOF therefore increasing feed 
costs and yardage costs.  Knowing the potential number of BRD treatments that would be 
required during backgrounding could potentially increase net revenues for stocker 
operations and feedlot managers. The ability to choose animals that would remain healthy 
throughout the production phase would decrease treatment costs.  Producers could also 
pay less for high risk cattle, precondition them, and then potentially resell them at higher 
prices.  Step et al. (2008) showed steers weaned 45 days prior to shipping to feedlots 
resulted in healthier cattle.  A high percentage of calves (91%) are diagnosed with BRD 
within the first 27 days after arrival at the feedlot (Buhman et al., 2000) and the majority 
of deaths due to BRD occur shortly after arrival to the feedlot, or within the first 45 days 




increased net revenues for stocker operations and feedlot managers could potentially be 
seen if cattle were in a 63-day backgrounding phase prior to shipment to the feedlot.  
 
Standardized Beta Coefficients 
The purpose of calculating standardized beta coefficients was to determine the most 
important factors affecting net returns. Tables 5, 6, and 7 report the standardized beta 
coefficients for the backgrounding, finishing, and combined phases, respectively. ADG 
was the most significant factor attributed to backgrounding net returns followed by cost 
as fed and then the amount of BRD treatments given to the heifer. Recall from the least 
squares means, those never treated had significantly higher ADG compared to those 
treated at least once. The number of times treated for BRD could have caused the ADG to 
be affecting net returns.  
 HCW had the greatest impact on finishing phase net returns and when the two 
phases were combined. This is similar to research by Ward and Johnson (2005) where 
weight was the strongest market signal compared to carcass quality characteristics when 
using grid pricing systems. For the finishing phase, G:F, start weight, and ADG were the 
next most important factors that impacted net returns. Those never treated for BRD or 
only treated once did significantly impact net returns compared to chronics based on the 
least squares means in all phases.  The performance characteristics, initial body weight, 
ADG, and feed-to-gain conversion, also significantly affected total net returns.  BRD 
treatments tend to affect other performance characteristics. As BRD treatments increase, 






The current study showed serum Hp concentration upon arrival to the feedlot had no 
effectiveness in predicting BRD incidence in a backgrounding phase.  BRD risk groups, 
based on serum Hp concentrations, had no effect on net returns. Further studies need to 
be conducted to examine economic efficiency of using HP concentration to predict the 
number of BRD treatments given its cost.   
As the number of BRD treatments increase, net returns decreased in the 
backgrounding and combined phases.  In the feeding phase alone, that trend was not 
evident.  That is, the primary impact on net returns occurs in the backgrounding phase.  
Predicting the number of BRD treatments (i.e. BRD incidence) seems especially 
important for producers considering retained ownership through feeding.  Knowing the 
propensity to contract BRD is of more value to the backgrounding phase but costs 





Figure II-1. Differences in net returns ($/head) by number of bovine respiratory 






































Figure II-2. Differences in cost of gain ($/kg of gain) by number of bovine 






























Number of Bovine Respiratory Treatments 
OX 1X 2X 3X CX3 Mortalities Total 
 Low 38 25 10 6 2 5 86 
(25.52%) 
 Medium 35 25 11 13 5 9 98 
(29.08%) 
High 40 48 21 24 5 15 153 
(45.40%) 
 Total 113 98 42 43 12 29 337 
(33.53%) (29.08%) (12.46%) (12.76%) (3.56%) (8.61%) 
1 Heifers were assigned pens according to Haptoglobin (Hp) concentration: Low (serum Hp<1.0 
mg/dL), Medium (1.0 mg/dL<serum Hp<3.0 mg/dL), and High (serum Hp>3.0 mg/DL). 
20X = never treated; 1X = treated 1 time for signs of BRD; 2X = treated twice for signs of BRD; 
3X = treated 3 times for signs of BRD; CX = classified as chronically ill. 
3 Conditions necessary to be considered a chronic were: received all three antimicrobial therapies 
according to protocol, on feed more than 21 days, and experienced a net loss of body weight over 





Table II-2: Premium/Discount Grid 
Slaughter Date 4/21/2008 5/13/2008 5/28/2008 
Choice Price $148.00 $151.50 $153.00 
Quality Grade 
Prime $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 
Choice $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Select -$3.00 -$4.00 -$5.00 
Standard -$25.00 -$25.00 -$25.00 
Yield Grade 
1 $3.00 $3.00 $3.00 
2 $1.50 $1.50 $1.50 
3 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
4 -$25.00 -$10.00 -$10.00 
5 -$25.00 -$25.00 -$25.00 
Weight Discounts 
< 550 -$40.00 -$40.00 -$40.00 
951-1000 -$5.00 -$5.00 -$5.00 
> 1000 -$25.00 -$25.00 -$25.00 
Other Discounts 
Commercial -$35.00 -$35.00 -$35.00 
Utility -$50.00 -$50.00 -$50.00 
Canner -$35.00 -$35.00 -$35.00 
Dark Cutter -$35.00 -$35.00 -$35.00 
Stag -$35.00 -$35.00 -$35.00 
Bull -$35.00 -$35.00 -$35.00 




Table II-3. Least Squares Means for Production Characteristics 
by Haptoglobin Risk Group1,2 
 
  
Risk Group  
Variable Low Medium High SEM3 
Backgrounding Phase  
Beginning Weight, kg4 241.74 236.45 240.28 2.78 
Beginning Weight, kg5 241.92 239.12 238.99 3.23 
Initial Price ($/head) 603.08 592.35 600.25 5.74 
ADG, kg/day 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.06 
Gain:Feed Conversion 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.005 
BRD Treatments Drugs, $/head 22.06 21.8 22.26 0.72 
Cost of Feed, $/head 59.41 59.04 58.86 2.76 
Cost of Gain, $/kg of gain6 2.65a 0.71b 2.51a 0.46 
End Weight, kg4 302.11 297.86 299.44 4.81 
End Price ($/head)4 648.64 640.32 643.68 9.07 
Net Returns, $/head -149.43 -145.05 -150.4 4.82 
Finishing Phase  
Start Weight, kg5 305.01 300.95 297.68 4.94 
Start Price ($/head)5 654.27 646.16 640.41 9.32 
ADG, kg/day 1.45 1.46 1.45 0.04 
Gain:Feed Conversion 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.003 
Cost of Feed, $/head 498.7 493.35 478.71 12.03 
Cost of Gain, $/kg of gain 2.16 2.07 2.07 0.08 
Net Returns, $/head -89.04 -107.07 -97.68 25.94 
Combined Phase  
DOF7 164.70 168.87 164.29 3.85 
Overall ADG, kg/day 1.34 1.34 1.32 0.04 
Gain:Feed Conversion 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.003 
Cost of Gain, $/kg of gain 2.01 1.94 1.94 0.06 
HCW, kg 337.55 334.05 331.78 5.53 
Marbling Score 479.82a 450.63a,b 433.49b 17.59 
Yield Grade 3.22 3.18 3.1 0.16 
Carcass Value ($/head) 1,085.76 1,083.47 1,078.27 17.62 
Net Returns, $/head -130.07 -151.61 -143.27 26.98 
a,b Indicate means in the same row with different superscript letter differ (P < 0.05) 
1 Mortalities are included in net return calculations but not in physical performance 
measures (average daily gain, cost of gain, or conversion)  
2 Heifers were assigned pens according to Haptoglobin (Hp) concentration: Low (serum 
Hp < 1.0 mg/dL), Medium (1.0 mg/dL < serum Hp < 3.0 mg/dL), and High (serum Hp > 
3.0 mg/DL). 
3Largest standard error of Least squares mean (SEM) shown 
4Indicates 337 heifers in backgrounding phase. 
5Indicates 193 heifers in finishing phase and overall. 
664 out of 89 heifers in the medium group, 4 had negative ADG leading to inflated COG. 
7DOF= Days on feed during finishing phase (all 193 animals in combined phase were on 





Table II-4. Least Squares Means for Production Characteristics by Number of Bovine Respiratory 
Disease Treatments1 
 
Number of Treatments  
Variable 0 1 2 3 Chronics2 Mortalities SEM
3 
Backgrounding Phase  
Beginning Weight, kg4 242.84 240.47 239.66 241.34 235.65 236.97 5.19 
Beginning Weight, kg5 241.99 243.15 237.85 241.42 235.65 5.28 
Initial Price, $/head 605.55 600.64 598.85 602.34 590.52 593.46 10.71 
ADG, kg/d 1.41a 1.27b 0.99c 0.66d 0.43d 0.11 
G:F Conversion 0.13a 0.13a 0.11b 0.10c 0.07d 0.01 
BRD Treatments Drugs, $/head 0.00a 9.63b 23.62c 35.71d 35.34d 27.93e 1.34 
Cost of Feed, $/head 85.05a 76.93b 63.47c 50.53d 44.12d,e 34.54e 5.16 
Cost of Gain, $/kg of gain 1.04a 1.19a,c 2.91b 2.07b,c 2.56a,b,c 0.80 
End Weight, kg4 331.66a 319.84b 301.87c 282.79d 262.84e 8.33 
End Price, $/head4 704.60a 682.48b 649.02c 612.13d 572.82e 15.72 
Net Returns, $/head 8.63a -9.98b -42.51c -81.87d -102.49e -661.56f 5.83 
Net Returns relative to 0X6 0.00 -18.61 -51.14 -90.50 -111.12 -670.19  
Finishing Phase  
Start Weight, kg5 333.35a 319.31b 304.91c 285.66d 262.84e 8.07 
Start Price, $/head5 707.89a 681.51b 654.88c 617.65d 572.82e 15.22 
ADG, kg/d 1.41 1.45 1.48 1.50 1.42 0.07 
G:F Conversion 0.11a 0.11a,b 0.11 a,b 0.11 a,b 0.12b 0.01 
Cost of Feed, $/head 486.18a 494.20a,b 484.11a 516.81b 469.97a 19.65 
Cost of Gain, $/kg of gain 2.25a 2.18a,b 2.07a,b 2.05a,b 1.96b 0.13 
Net Returns, $/head -110.53 -73.73 -73.49 -92.71 -139.19 42.38 






Table II-4. Continued 
Number of Treatments 
Variable 0 1 2 3 Chronics2 Mortalities SEM 
Combined Phase  
DOF7 159.28a 162.17a 163.72a,b 171.84b 172.73b 6.29 
Overall ADG, kg/d 1.42a 1.39a,b 1.37a,b 1.31b,c 1.19c 0.06 
G:F Conversion 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.01 
Cost of Gain, $/kg of gain 1.87a 1.92a 1.94a,b 2.06b 2.05a,b 0.09 
HCW, kg 343.23a 337.36a,b 332.80a,b 339.12a,b 319.78b 9.28 
Marbling Score 480.43 465.33 444.75 453.56 429.17 29.31 
Yield Grade 3.35a 3.25a,b 3.10a,b 2.94b 3.19a,b 0.28 
Carcass Value, $/head 1,105.71a 1,101.05a 1,078.40a 1,116.48a 1,010.87b 35.41 
Net Returns, $/head -98.40a -88.28a -109.48a,b -170.41b,c -241.68c 44.09 
Net Returns relative to OX6 0.00 10.12 -11.08 -72.01 -143.28  
a-e Indicate means in the same row with a different superscript letter differ (P < 0.05).  
1 Mortalities are included in net return calculations but not in physical performance measures (average daily 
gain, cost of gain, or conversion).  
2 Conditions necessary to be considered chronically ill were: received all three antimicrobial therapies 
according to protocol, on feed more than 21 days, and experienced a net loss of body weight over the 
preceding 21 days on feed. 
3Largest standard error of Least squares mean (SEM) shown 
4Indicates 337 heifers in backgrounding phase.  
5Indicates 193 heifers in finishing phase and overall. 
6Net returns relative to 0X treatment group, $/head, based on least squares mean 












Intercept -61.464 2.360 <.0001 0.000 
Beginning Weight, kg -0.156 0.012 <.0001 -0.058 
ADG, kg/day 140.396 3.597 <.0001 1.427 
Gain:Feed Conversion -39.159 14.357 0.007 -0.027 
Cost of Feed, $/head -1.415 0.065 <.0001 -0.661 
Low Haptoglobin Risk Group  
with respect to High Risk Group 
-0.090 0.342 0.792 -0.001 
Medium Haptoglobin Risk Group 
with respect to High Risk Group 
-0.178 0.331 0.592 -0.002 
Zero BRD Treatments with 
respect to Chronics 
35.480 0.869 <.0001 0.389 
One BRD Treatment with respect 
to Chronics 
26.014 0.851 <.0001 0.275 
Two BRD Treatments with 
respect to Chronics 
12.316 0.865 <.0001 0.097 
Three BRD Treatments with 
respect to Chronics 












Intercept -724.091 175.003 <.0001 0.000 
Start Weight, kg -1.441 0.299 <.0001 -0.452 
ADG, kg/day -149.273 76.187 0.052 -0.311 
Gain:Feed Conversion 2879.812 1026.068 0.006 0.491 
Cost of Feed, $/head -0.084 0.240 0.728 -0.028 
Hot Carcass Weight, kg 2.950 0.294 <.0001 0.801 
Marbling Score 0.125 0.048 0.011 0.108 
Yield Grade -18.408 5.002 0.0003 -0.151 
Low Haptoglobin Risk Group  
with respect to High Risk Group 
4.737 9.737 0.627 0.020 
Medium Haptoglobin Risk Group  
with respect to High Risk Group 
-11.095 9.129 0.226 -0.050 
Zero BRD Treatments with respect 
to Chronics 
37.078 21.836 0.0913 0.164 
One BRD Treatment with respect 
to Chronics 
52.920 21.328 0.0141 0.235 
Two BRD Treatments with respect 
to Chronics 
37.772 21.625 0.083 0.140 
Three BRD Treatments with 
respect to Chronics 













Intercept -847.175 162.543 <.0001 0.000 
Beginning Weight, kg -1.650 0.301 <.0001 -0.259 
ADG, kg/day -176.702 50.120 0.001 -0.326 
Gain:Feed Conversion 3432.691 740.836 <.0001 0.445 
Cost of Feed, $/head -0.105 0.209 0.617 -0.030 
Hot Carcass Weight, kg 2.940 0.292 <.0001 0.764 
Marble Score 0.124 0.048 0.011 0.102 
Yield Grade -18.506 4.960 0.0003 -0.146 
Low Haptoglobin Risk Group  
with respect to High Risk Group 
5.816 9.633 0.547 0.023 
Medium Haptoglobin Risk Group  
with respect to High Risk Group 
-10.030 9.016 0.268 -0.043 
Zero BRD Treatments with 
respect to Chronics 
76.875 21.418 0.0004 0.325 
One BRD Treatments with 
respect to Chronics 
80.080 20.331 0.0001 0.340 
Two BRD Treatments with 
respect to Chronics 
49.932 20.740 0.017 0.176 
Three BRD Treatments with 
respect to Chronics 








STATED AND REVEALED PREFERENCES FOR ORGANIC AND CLONED 
MILK: COMBINING CHOICE EXPERIMENT AND SCANNER DATA  
 
Introduction 
Food demand analysis has traditionally utilized aggregate time-series data representing 
consumers’ actual food purchases in the marketplace.  There are at least two weaknesses 
of demand analyses carried out with such revealed preference (RP) data.  First, the 
researcher has no control over the data collected.  Price changes are often highly co-
linear, measured with error, endogenously determined, and may be confounded with 
changes in quality.  Second, it is difficult or impossible to use RP data to infer how 
consumers will react to the introduction of a new good.  In recent years, researchers 
addressed these difficulties by turning to the use of disaggregated stated preference (SP) 
data.  SP data are useful because consumers can be asked about their willingness to 
purchase any product including those currently unavailable in the marketplace and 
because the researcher controls the data collection process insuring price changes are 
uncorrelated with other variables of interest. 
 That RP data lack information on consumer preferences for new varieties is 




consumers respond to the introduction of milk from cloned cows?  In January 2008, the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concluded that, “meat and milk from clones 
of cattle, swine, and goats, and the offspring of clones from any species traditionally 
consumed as food, are as safe to eat as food from conventionally bred animals.”  With 
this statement, the prospect of food from cloned animals entering the marketplace became 
a reality.  The announcement prompted some consumer groups and food retailers to 
implement initiatives to assuage perceived consumer concern for the technology.  Several 
large food processors and retailers announced their intention to prohibit the sales of 
products from cloned animals, and in late 2007, the U.S. Senate passed legislation 
intended to prohibit the FDA from approving cloned products until further research was 
conducted (however, the final legislation that was signed into law only “strongly 
encouraged” the FDA to delay any major decision until additional studies were 
conducted).   Understanding the economic effects of such decisions, and informing 
businesses and policy makers about the appropriateness of future decisions requires 
estimates of consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for cloned products. 
 Previous research on animal cloning has consisted of telephone polls asking 
consumers questions about their knowledge and attitude towards animal cloning.  For 
example, a study conducted for the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology in 2006 
showed that about 65% of consumers have heard about animal cloning (Mellman Group 
2006).  Sosin and Richards (2005), however, reported that only about 29% of consumers 
believed that animal cloning is currently used by farmers and ranchers to breed animals. 
Storey (2006) reported that 73% of consumers had not heard about the FDA report on the 




they would be willing to purchase milk from the offspring of cloned animals while about 
33% indicated that they would never buy milk from the offspring of cloned animals.  The 
International Food Information Council (2006, 2007) showed similar results in their poll, 
with 41% of consumers indicating that they would be willing to purchase meat, milk, or 
eggs from the offspring of cloned animals in 2006; a figure which increased to 46% in 
2007.  
Although previous polling research has provided useful information, the results 
consist of purchase intentions or attitudes expressed on a five-point scale. It is difficult to 
use such data to determine the rate at which consumers are willing to trade concern for 
cloning and a desire for lower milk prices.  That is, the data do not provide willingness-
to-pay estimates that can be used in cost benefit analysis or in making market share 
predictions.  Moreover, a wealth of evidence indicates such data often poorly predict 
actual retail behavior (Morrison 1979; Morwitz 1997). 
 The fact that milk from cloned cows is not currently labeled and sold in the 
market place necessarily implies that the only way to determine consumer preferences for 
the attribute is by using SP or experimental methods.  Although SP methods permit the 
estimation of WTP for milk from clones, there exists ample skepticism of people’s stated 
answers to hypothetical questions about what they would do when shopping.  One 
potential way of overcoming this weakness is to combine people’s SP survey answers 
with RP data resulting from actual market transactions in an attempt to achieve a more 
useful and reliable picture of consumer preferences that possess the advantages of RP 
data (reflecting binding choices made in real markets) and the advantages of SP data 




confounds).  Thus, although milk from cloned cattle is not currently sold in the 
marketplace, if the preferences expressed in a SP survey (including the attribute of 
cloning) are systematically related to the preferences governing choices in RP data, we 
might be more confident in the reliability of the estimate on consumers’ preferences for 
cloning.  Moreover, as von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008) have argued, SP data provide a 
means of econometrically identifying parameters that would be confounded using RP 
data alone. 
 Such logic has led researchers in recent years to combine sources of RP and SP 
data primarily as it relates to the valuation of environmental amenities (e.g., Adamowicz 
et al. 1994, 1997; Azevedo, Herriges, and Kling 2003; Huang, Haab, and Whitehead 
1997) or transportation (e.g., Swait, Louviere, and Williams 1994).  Louviere, Hensher, 
and Swait (2000) and Hensher, Louviere, and Swait (1998) provide general discussions 
and overviews on combining SP and RP data.  A common feature among many of these 
studies, however, is that the RP data come from survey-based questions where people are 
asked to recall choices they previously made.  Unfortunately, recall of past choices and 
behaviors is often inaccurate (Vazire and Mehl 2008).  For example, Dickson and Sawyer 
(1990) showed that most grocery shoppers cannot remember the price of the item just 
placed in their basket.  Ideally, objective m asures of past RP choices would be used, and 
it is here that household scanner data are quite useful.  To our knowledge, Swait and 
Andrews (2003) represent the only previous attempt to investigate whether SP data could 
be combined with scanner data.  In an application related to laundry detergent, they found 
that a combined RP-SP model exhibited superior out-of-sample prediction performance 




 In this paper, we seek to determine whether SP choices between milk options can 
be fruitfully combined with the same household’s RP choices reflected in scanner data.  
The current research is similar in spirit to the Swait and Andrews (2003) study, but seeks 
to validate their findings in a different context of current policy relevance.  Whereas, 
Swait and Andrews (2003) sought to combine SP and RP data from two different samples 
of individuals, we have SP and RP data from the same households, making for a 
“cleaner” comparison.  In addition to seeking an answer to the methodological question 
of whether a model can be developed that predicts people’s actual milk choices but that 
includes information on preferences for the new attribute of cloning, this work adds to the 
growing applied literature on people’s demand for milk attributes.  For example, Dhar 
and Foltz (2005) used store-level scanner data to estimate the consumer welfare effects of 
the introduction of rBST-free and organic labeled milk, Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2007) 
used household scanner data to estimate the value of the USDA organic seal on milk, and 
Bernard and Bernard (2009) used experimental auctions to estimate consumer WTP for 
organic, rBST-free, antibiotic-free, and conventional milk.  To our knowledge, no 
previous study has estimated consumer demand for milk from cloned vs. non-cloned 
cows; however, it is exactly this information that is currently needed by policy makers 
and food retailers.   
 
Data and Methods 
Our data come from 1,552 households in the Information Resources Inc (IRI) 
AttitudeLink™ panel.  IRI Panelists use handheld scanners to record their bar-coded 




SP survey to 4,000 households in the IRI panel.  1,691 people completed the survey, 
implying a response rate of 42.3%.  For each of the 1,691 households, IRI provided RP 
home scan data on milk purchases (organic and non-organic by fat content) aggregated 
over the 52 week period prior to the survey.  Importantly, the RP home scan data are not 
based on consumers’ potentially unreliable memories of past behavior but instead 
represent actual purchase histories.   
The characteristics of sample of respondents used in this study match up well with 
that of the U.S. as a whole, except the sample consists of a larger share of females and 
only of primary grocery shoppers than is present in the U.S. population.  These deviations 
are not problematic given our focus on food choices of the primary shopper in a 
household. 
 Of the 1,691 households, 139 were not used due to incomplete information and 
missing scanner data leaving 1,552 households available for analysis.  From the available 
sample, we randomly drew data from 500 households for use in out-of-sample model 
validation, and data from the remaining 1,052 households are used for model estimation.  
 
Stated Preference Data 
In the online survey, panelists were asked to answer a series of discrete choice questions 
regarding which milk option (or none) they would buy when grocery shopping. The 
choice options were defined by four attributes: price per gallon ($2.99 or $5.99), fat 
content (whole, 2%, 1%, skim), use of rBST (no rBST used or rBST used), and use of 




of cloned animal).2 Because some respondents might have been unknowledgeable of 
rBST or cloning, we included a very brief description of each.  In regards to cloning, 
respondents were told the FDA definition: “Animal cloning is a process in which 
scientists can copy the genetic or inherited traits of an animal. Cloned animals are similar 
to identical twins only born at different times.”(U.S. FDA 2009a).  With regard to rBST, 
respondents were informed, “Some of the milk products indicate that they were produced 
with rBST, which is a bovine growth hormone that increases milk production in cows.” 
(U.S. FDA 2009b). More could have been said about both attributes, however, we felt 
these brief statements would likely coincide with the information shoppers would have in 
a grocery store.    
In constructing the choice questions, the cloning attribute was treated as 
alternative-specific, such that option A was always “milk from non-cloned animal,” 
option B, was always “milk from cloned animal,” and option C was always “milk from 
offspring of cloned animal.” Option D was added to allow people to indicate “no 
purchase.” More specifically, Option D stated, “If options A, B, and C were all that was 
available when shopping at my local grocery store, I would not purchase milk from this 
store.”  A main effects fractional factorial design was used to determine which milk 
options to present to respondents.  Price and rBST were varied at two levels each and fat 
content was varied at four levels so there were 22 x 4 = 16 possible combinations of milk 
options that could be created for each choice option A, B, and C. Because there were 
three milk options in each choice set, there were 163 = 4,096 possible choice sets that 
                                                          
2 We considered including the attribute of organic in the SP survey; however, the attribute was ultimately 
excluded because we believed respondents would find it unbelievable to find a milk option that was both 
organic and from a cloned cow.  In fact, the USDA’s National Organic Standards Board (NOSB) has ruled 
that milk from a cloned animal or from any of its offspring (or the offspring of the offspring) cannot obtain 




could be constructed.  From this full factorial, 16 choice tasks were selected such that the 
correlations between attributes, both within and across options, were exactly zero.  Each 
respondent answered 16 SP choice questions, an example of which is shown in figure III-
1.  
 
Revealed Preference Data 
For each household, IRI provided home scan data for white milk segregated by fat 
content (whole, 2%, 1%, and skim) and by organic (organic and non-organic), which 
implies that the RP data consist of eight possible purchase options (4 fat levels x 2 levels 
of organic).  The RP data included total volume (gallons) purchased in the 52 weeks 
preceding the survey, total expenditures spent on white milk in the 52 weeks preceding 
the survey, and total number of units purchased in the 52 weeks preceding the survey.  
Purchase shares for each household were computed for each of the eight options by 
dividing the volume purchased of each type by the total volume of all milk purchased.  
Average prices ($/gallon) paid were constructed by dividing total expenditures on each 
milk type by volume purchased of each type.  The raw means for the prices and purchase 
shares are shown in table III-1. 
Because milk prices might be correlated with unobserved quality differences, we 
followed the approaches outlined in Cox and Wohlgenant (1986) and Park and Capps 
(1997) which is predicated on the idea that price variation across households reflects 
differences in quality.  Prices for each of the eight types of milk were regressed on 
region, race, income, gender, age, and average unit size purchased (total volume divided 




(3.1) ;<=>!'  ?@A@B  >!' 
where ;<=>!' is the price per gallon of milk type j purchased by individual i, ?@ is a 
vector of demographic variables described above, A@B is a conformable vector of 
parameters, and >!' is the residual.  Quality adjusted prices were calculated for each 
individual by adding the estimated intercept of equation (3.1) to the residuals of equation 
(3.1) (see Cox and Wohlgenant 1986; Park and Capps 1997).  Households that did not 
purchase a particular type of milk in the preceding year were assigned a price equal to the 
intercept from equation (3.1). 
 
Econometric Models 
Based on the random utility framework, individual i’s utility from choice option jis 
specified as a function of a systematic component assumed to depend on the attributes of 
the choice option (e.g., price, fat content) and a stochastic error term representing 
individual idiosyncrasies unobservable to the analyst: 
(3.2) C!'  D!'  -!' 
For the SP data, the systematic portion of the utility function for milk option j is: 
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where (Price)ij is the price faced by individual i for alterative j, the &’s are the marginal 
utilities for the attributes, and the remaining variables are dummy variables indicating the 
presence/absence of the characteristic in question in alternative j.  For identification 




&R, &T, and &U represent the utility of having a gallon of milk from a non-cloned, cloned, 
and offspring of cloned animal, respectively relative to not purchasing milk at all on the 
particular shopping occasion.  Thus, the relative utility of non-cloned vs. cloned is &R -
&T.   For the RP data, the systematic portion of the utility function can be similarly 
written: 
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   If the error terms in equation (3.2) are distributed iid type I extreme value, 
McFadden (1974) shows that out of a set of Jalternatives, the probability of alternative j 
being chosen is the familiar multinomial logit model (MNL):  
(3.5)  !'   Proboption b is chosen
  ghi6j∑ ghi6klkmn  
where o is a parameter inversely related to the variance of the error term.  Within a data 
set, o is not separately identified from the preference parameters in (3.3) or (3.4), and is 
thus normalized to one.  However, when SP and RP data are pooled, the relative 
magnitude of o across data sets can be identified by setting the parameter equal to one in 
one data set and estimating the relative size of the parameter for the other data set (see 
Swait and Louviere 1993).   
 The parameters of the unrestricted (SP-only and RP-only) models given in 
equations (3.3) and (3.4) can be estimated by maximizing the respective log-likelihood 
functions:  
(3.6)  ppqEF  ∑ rs!' 5 lnr∑ !'L'$% uu/5%R!$%  




where s!' = 1 if option j is chosen by person i in the SP data set and 0 otherwise, .!' is the 
purchase share for alternative j and household i in the RP data set, and !' is defined in 
(3.5).   
 As can be seen by comparing equations (3.3) and (3.4), the SP and RP preference 
functions have four common parameters related to price and milk fat content.  These 
common parameters can be combined in restricted (pooled) RP-SP model:  
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The pooled log-likelihood function is estimated by maximizing the 
function: ppqvwwxgy  ppqEF  ppq0F, in which equation (3.8) acts as the underlying 
utility function for both SP and RP data.3   
To determine whether the same preference structure underlies the RP and SP data, 
we first used an in-sample likelihood ratio test.  In particular, two times the sum of the 
likelihood function values from the two unrestricted models subtracted from the 
likelihood function of the restricted (pooled) model is compared against the critical chi-
square value with four degrees of freedom.  The null hypothesis is that the common price 
and fat content parameters are equivalent across the two data sources: &%EF  &%0F, &#EF 
 &#0F, &)EF  &)0F, &LEF  &L0F. 
                                                          
3 Because we effectively have 16 times more SP data than RP data, it is possible for the SP data to 
“dominate” the common parameters in pooled model. To account for this fact, we have also estimated 
pooled models where each SP choice observation is given a weight equal to 1/16.  None of our primary 
conclusions regarding whether the data can be pooled according to in-sample tests or which model 
performs best in out-of-sample forecasting tests is affected by whether such weights are used.  As such, all 




Swait and Andrews (2003) have shown that even when the hypothesis of common 
preference parameters is rejected, a combined RP-SP model can exhibit superior out-of-
sample prediction performance.  To investigate this issue, we use the results from our 
estimation data set to predict the outcomes of our hold-out data set of 500 household’s 
RP and SP choices.  We consider three metrics of out-of-sample prediction performance: 
mean squared error, the value of the log-likelihood function evaluated at out-of-sample 
observations (see Norwood, Lusk, and Brorsen 2004), and the percent of out-of-sample 
choices correctly predicted.  Mean squared error (MSE) is simply calculated as the 
average of the squared difference between the predicted and actual shares for each choice 
option.  For the SP data, we do not have actual shares but rather have dummy variables 
taking the value of 1 for options that were chosen and 0 for those options that were not 
chosen.  A model with a smaller MSE is more preferred.  The out-of-sample log 
likelihood function (OSLLF) is calculated by multiplying the actual share (or actual 
choice dummy variable) by the natural log of the predicted share for each choice option 
and summing these values across all choices in the hold-out data set.  Models with higher 
OSLLF values are preferred.  Finally, we say that an out-of-sample choice has been 
correctly predicted if the choice option that has the highest predicted share also has the 
highest actual share in the RP data set or was actually chosen in the SP data set.4   
                                                          
4 In addition to the MNL models outlined above, we also estimated a more general random parameter logit 
(RPL) model which accounts for the repeated nature of the choice data (i.e., each household has 16 SP 
choices and one RP choice) and allows for preference heterogeneity. The RPL model fits the data better in 
sample for the SP data but not for the RP data. Despite the good in-sample fit of the RPL models, they 
never outperform the MNL models in predicting out-of-sample choices. Because the MNL dominated the 
RPL in terms of out-of-sample prediction performance, we only report the results of the MNL here.  
Moreover, we had difficulty getting the RPL to converge with the RP data, a fact which we attribute to high 
correlation between prices and product characteristics in the RP data.   Several authors have noted problems 
with empirical identifiability with the RPL in such data sets (see Cherci & Ortuzar 2008; Chiou & Walker 






Estimation results are shown in table III-2.  Models 1 and 2 are the SP-only and RP-only 
models.  The results are consistent with expectations: people dislike price increases, 
prefer rBST free to rBST, prefer non-cloned to cloned, and prefer organic to non-organic 
milk.  In both data sets, whole milk is less preferred to skim and 2% is preferred to skim.  
However, the two data sets differ in terms of the estimated preference for 1% milk.  In 
the RP data set (model 2), skim is preferred to 1%, but in the SP data set (model 1) 
people, on average, are indifferent between skim and 1% milk.   
The third model combines the SP and RP data and estimates a pooled model 
where the price and fat coefficients are constrained to be equal across the two data sets 
while allowing for differences in error variance across the two data sets via the relative 
scale parameter.  The log likelihood function for model 3 (the pooled model), -17,636.54 
and the sum of the log likelihood function values for models 1 and 2, -17,592.11, is 
similar; however, results of a likelihood ratio test indicate that the hypothesis of equal SP 
and RP parameters can be rejected at the 1% significance level (i.e., the chi-square value 
is 2*(17,636.54-17,592.11) = 88.86, which can be compared against the critical chi-
square value with 4 degrees of freedom at the 99% confidence level, which is 13.3). 
The results discussed thus far would seem to suggest little support for combining 
SP and RP data, and might lead one to conclude that people apparently exhibit differing 
preferences when answering survey questions as compared to shopping in grocery stores.  
Such a conclusion, however, might be premature.  First, we ask, are the preferences 
displayed in the SP and RP data sets even related to one another?  Figure III-2 utilizes the 




SP and RP parameters.  For illustrative purposes figure III-2 also plots the value of the 
organic parameter (in the RP data set only) against the rBST-free parameter.  As can be 
seen in figure III-2, there is clearly a positive relationship between the SP and RP 
preferences.  In fact, the correlation coefficient between the SP and RP coefficients for 
the four common parameters (price and three fat content parameters) is 0.78.  If we add in 
the rBST free and organic parameters, the correlation coefficient between the SP and RP 
parameters increases to 0.89.  Thus, even though the in-sample likelihood ratio tests 
indicates that strict equality of parameters is rejected, figure 2 illustrates that the SP and 
RP choices are clearly related.5   
 Figure III-2 suggests the presence of some common underlying choice patterns in 
the SP and RP data, and gives some credibility to the idea that a pooled SP-RP model 
might be beneficial despite the results of the in-sample likelihood ratio tests.  Given that 
the purpose of this study is to predict what shoppers would do if and when cloned milk 
enters the market, it is prudent, then, to determine the extent to which the three models 
reported in table III-2 predict the hold-out sample of 500 households’ SP and RP choices.   
 Table III-3 reports the out-of-sample prediction performance of the three 
estimated models in regards to their ability to predict SP choices, RP choices, and pooled 
SP-RP choices in the hold-out data set (recall that out of the 1,552 individuals surveyed, 
                                                          
5 Another way to address this question is to investigate the covariance relationship between SP and RP 
parameters in an RPL model.  We estimated an RPL model fit to the combined SP-RP data set where none 
of the parameters were restricted to be equal.   Of interest are the correlations between parameters that are 
common across the two data sets (i.e., are the people who preferred 1% milk in the SP data set the same 
people who preferred 1% milk in the RP data set?) and the correlations between parameters that differ 
across the two data sets (i.e., are the people who preferred rBST free in the SP data set the same people 
who preferred organic milk in the RP data set?) The RPL results suggest that the SP and RP parameters are 
highly related.  For example, the correlation between the RP price coefficient and the SP price coefficient is 
0.99.  The results also indicate that the same people who exhibit stronger preferences for organic when 
grocery shopping tend to be the same people who preferred rBST-free and were averse to cloned milk when 
making stated preference choices (correlation coefficients of 0.54 and 0.05, respectively).  See appendix A 





data from 1,052 households were randomly selected and used for the model estimation 
and the remaining 500 were used for validation).  The out-of-sample log likelihood 
functions (OSLLF) and mean-square-error (MSE) prediction criteria yield similar results 
in terms of the relative model rankings.   
In terms of the OSLLF and MSE, results indicate that when predicting SP data 
that the SP-only model (model 1) and the pooled SP-RP model (model 3) perform equally 
well.  The RP-only model (model 2) exhibits dismal performance in predicting hold-out 
SP choices.  It might seem a bit strange to remark on the ability of RP data to predict SP 
choices, but recall that we are interested in predicting how consumers will react to the 
introduction of cloned milk.  The RP data has nothing to say about consumer preferences 
for cloned vs. non-cloned milk, and thus it performs especially poorly in predicting SP 
choices.  This result might be taken to imply that if cloned milk enters the market place, 
models estimated using RP data only prior to the introduction of cloned would yield 
incorrect forecasts of future market conditions. 
Table III-3 also shows that when predicting the RP hold-out data, the RP-only 
model (model 2) performs the best according to the OSLLF and MSE criteria.  However, 
the pooled SP-RP model (model 3) only fares slightly worse than the RP-only model 
(model 2) in predicting RP choices.  Moreover, the last three rows of table III-3 indicate 
that the pooled SP-RP model (model 3) correctly predicts which choice was made in the 
SP data set equally as well as the SP-only model (model 1) and makes slightly better 
predictions in the RP data set than the RP-only model (model 2).  The combined weight 
of the evidence in table III-3 suggests that the pooled SP-RP model (model 3) is the 




the RP-model alone and equally as well as the SP-only model, and the pooled SP-RP 
model predicts hold-out RP choices much better than the SP-model alone and about as 
well or better than the RP-only model.   
 What do the results from the preferred model (model 3) imply about consumer 
preferences for organic and rBST-free milk and for milk from cloned cattle?  Table III-4 
reports mean WTP values for selected attributes.  The reported statistics are the estimated 
price differences that would make a consumer indifferent between two milk options that 
are otherwise identical except for the attribute in question.  The values are calculated by 
dividing the respective attribute coefficients by the negative of the price coefficient.  
Results reveal consumers are willing to pay about $1.46/gallon for rBST free milk and 
about $1.51/gallon for organic milk.  These estimates are quite a bit higher than the 
implied premiums obtained by Bernard and Bernard (2009) who, using experimental 
auctions, found average WTP premiums of about $0.15 and $0.33 per half gallon, but are 
quite a bit lower than the “virtual prices” estimated for these milk types by Dhar and 
Foltz (2005).  The results in Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2007) suggest WTP premiums for 
organic milk of $1.46/gallon without the USDA seal and $2.16/gallon with the seal.6  Our 
findings are qualitatively similar to Bernard and Bernard (2009) in the sense that we 
found people were not willing to pay much more for organic milk than for rBST free milk 
despite the fact that former implies the latter.  As another point of comparison, we also 
calculated the implied demand elasticities using the pooled model assuming a choice set 
consisting of four options (conventional, rBST free, organic, and “none”) assuming all 
were non-cloned and of the same fat content.  Results reveal that at the prices of $2.80, 
                                                          
6 These results are calculated using the “after NOP” regression results reported in model 4, table 4 in Kiesel 





$4.85, and $5.91 (the average prices reported in Dhar and Foltz (2005)), the own-price 
elasticities of demand are -0.74, -1.48, and -2.08 for conventional, rBST free, and organic 
milk, respectively.  These can be compared against the respective values of -1.08, -4.40, 
and -1.37 in Dhar and Foltz (2005) and -0.96, -4.70, and -2.34 in Bernard and Bernard 
(2009).    
 One issue addressed in this study that was not addressed in previous studies is 
consumer preference for cloning.  As shown in table 4, people are willing to pay large 
premiums to avoid cloned milk: $4.71 per gallon.  This is over three timeshe amount 
people are willing to pay for organic or rBST-free milk.  The mean WTP estimate might 
be interpreted with some caution given that the prices in our SP survey only spanned $3 
(from $2.99 to $5.99); however, we can be relatively more confident in asserting that 
WTP for cloned vs. non-cloned milk is at least $3 per gallon.  That said, one advantage 
of combining the SP and RP data is that the RP data exhibit larger price variations that 
more than encompass the WTP estimate (see table III-1).  
The results shown in table III-4 also suggest that consumers do not differentiate 
much between milk from a clone and milk from the offspring of a clone.  This is 
important because most of the cattle that are currently being cloned are for use in seed-
stock and breeding, i.e, the production of offspring for use in commercial production.  
Such a high WTP value is consistent with the position of many companies who 
announced their intention to prohibit selling milk and meat from clones in the aftermath 
of the FDA announcement on the safety of food from clones.     
 The pooled MNL estimates can also be used to address a key policy issue: the 




cloned animals or their offspring, and thus most consumers are unaware whether the milk 
they buy is from cloned animals.  In fact, in the survey, we asked respondents whether 
they thought products from cloned cows were already sold in the grocery store and about 
60% indicated they did not know.  Such results suggest that in the current market 
environment, most people are uncertain whether the milk they are buying is from cloned 
cows.  Given this level of uncertainty, we assumed in our policy simulations that that 
consumers currently believe they have a 50/50 chance of purchasing milk from a clone 
and non-cloned animal when buying unlabeled milk. 
To set the stage for the analysis that follows, imagine a base-line (pre-label) 
market environment, where consumers have five choices: whole, 2%, 1%, and skim (all 
assumed non-organic, rBST-free, and all priced at $4), and a “no purchase” option.  We 
also assume that, because consumers are unsure about the presence and use of cloning, 
that their utility for each milk option is a weighted average of the cloned and non-cloned 
utility coefficients shown in equation (3.8) (i.e., 0 5&Rvwwxgy  0.5&Tvwwxgy).  In effect, we 
assume that when the consumers go to the grocery store to buy milk they believe that half 
is from cloned cattle and the other half is from non-cloned cattle.  Figure III-3 shows the 
calculated market shares for the five choices in the assumed base-line (pre-label) 
condition.  Results indicate about a quarter of the shoppers chose not to purchase milk, 
and conditional on a purchase, 2% fat is most popular.  That such a high share predicted 
to chose none illustrates the potential effect of uncertainty about cloning on market 
demand.  If people are unsure whether the milk they buy is from clones, they are likely to 
buy less milk than they might if they knew for sure, and it is exactly this sort of reasoning 




 The value of a mandatory labeling program depends on assumptions about how 
retailers will respond to the requirement and on what one assumes about current market 
conditions.  As such, we calculate the value of a mandatory labeling program under three 
different scenarios that make different assumptions about current and future states of 
nature: 
• Scenario1: In the pre-labeling world, it is assumed that milk from clones is 
actually sold in stores even though consumers believe there is a 50/50 chance (or 
mix) of buying cloned and non-cloned milk.   Retailers are assumed to respond to 
the mandatory labeling law by labeling all products as “may contain milk from 
cloned cattle.”   
• Scenario 2:  In the pre-labeling world, it is assumed that milk from clones is not 
sold in stores even though consumers believe there is a 50/50 chance (or mix) of 
buying cloned and non-cloned milk.   Retailers are assumed to respond to the 
mandatory labeling law by labeling all products as “milk from non-cloned cattle.”   
• Scenario 3: In the pre-labeling world, it is assumed that there is a 50/50 chance (or 
mix) of buying cloned and non-cloned milk from grocery stores and consumers’ 
beliefs are consistent with this reality. Retailers are assumed to respond to the 
mandatory labeling law by creating a differentiated marketplace offering milk 
both from cloned and non-cloned cattle.   
In scenarios 1 and 2, the mandatory labeling policy does not actually change the 
underlying quality of the product.  The labels simply serve to provide information to 
consumers about the choices they actually face.  In these scenarios, consumers faced 




between four milk options (and none) after the policy; the difference is that consumers’ 
uncertainty about whether milk is from clones or non-clones has been resolved by the 
policy.  However, because the actual quality of the milk has not changed, conventional 
welfare measures are inappropriate.  Rather, the value of the mandatory labeling policy is 
calculated by determining the value of information as in Hu, Veeman, and Adamowicz 
(2005) or Leggett (2002). 
      In particular, as shown by Leggett (2002), the appropriate welfare measure for 
scenarios 2 and 3 is:  
(3.9) }~∑ gi6kkmn 1~∑ gi6kkmn 1n   ∑ Fk6k16k
kmn 1n , 
where  &%  is the price coefficient from the pooled model 3,  is the probability of 
choice defined in equation (3.5), and D! is defined in equation (3.8).  The first term in 
brackets is the conventional welfare calculation except that the utility in the pre-label 
world, D!vg1xgx, is based on consumers’ perceptions f what they were buying (50/50 
cloned and non-cloned) rather than the actual product quality.  The second term in 
brackets captures the value of the adjustment in choices consumers make in response to 
the revelation of information about milk quality.  In the case of scenario 3, consumers’ 
beliefs are assumed to be correct, D!vg1xgx=D!vg1xgx, and retailers are assumed to 
respond in such a way that consumers actually face a different set of choices.  In this 
case, the conventional welfare measure is appropriate, and is given by: 
(3.10) 





where it is assumed consumers face nine choices in the post-label world (4 fat contents 
that are either cloned or not-cloned plus the none option).  Whereas scenarios 1 and 2 
assume constant prices pre- and post-label (because it is assumed the actual product 
quality has not changed), in scenario 3, we assume that in the post-label world milk from 
clones is priced at a 5% discount to non-cloned milk ($3.90 vs. $4.10 per gallon) to 
capture the cost decreases that are likely to result from the technology.    
 For scenario 1, results indicate that consumers are willing to pay $0.26 per choice 
for a mandatory labeling system.  Recall scenario 1 is one in which the policy simply 
serves to reveal to consumers that they are consuming cloned milk.  Our scanner data 
indicate that, on average, a household purchases approximately 34.93 units of milk per 
year (i.e., they made 34.93 choices per year).  Thus, the average annual benefit per year 
would be approximately $9.08 per household.  Given that there are 112,377,977 U.S. 
households (US Census Bureau 2007), the total estimated annual benefit of a mandatory 
labeling system given the assumptions of scenario 1 would be approximately $1.021 
billion.  
 Scenario 2 assumes that there is no cloned milk currently being sold, and the 
mandatory labeling policy simply serves to reveal this information to consumers.  In this 
case, WTP for the policy is $0.19 per choice occasion, which in aggregate implies a total 
estimated annual benefit of approximately $746 million for scenario 2.  
 Scenario 3 assumes that consumers (correctly) assume there is a mix of milk from 
clones and non-clones currently on the market, and that retailers respond to the labeling 
policy by segregating the market by offering cloned and non-cloned varieties for each 




when a mandatory labeling is put into place under the assumptions outlined in scenario 3.  
In this case, the fraction of consumers predicted to refrain from purchasing milk 
decreases to about 10%.  As compared to the prediction in figure 3, providing additional 
choice options to consumers is projected to increase milk consumption by approximately 
16%.  Using equation (10), we calculate that consumers are willing to pay $2.12 per 
choice occasion for a mandatory labeling system under scenario 3, which amounts to 
approximately $8.322 billion in aggregate. 7  
 
Conclusions 
This study sought to determine consumer preferences for a new attribute currently 
unlabeled in the market (milk from cloned cows) while seeking to identify whether stated 
preference choices for the new attribute were congruent with people’s revealed 
preferences given by scanner data.  Although we reject the hypothesis of common 
preference parameters across the revealed and stated preference data sets in sample, our 
analysis suggests that a pooled model exhibits better overall out-of-sample prediction 
performance than either stated or revealed preference data used in isolation.   
 Results from the pooled revealed-stated preference model indicate that consumers 
are quite averse to the use of cloning.  Willingness-to-pay to avoid cloned milk was over 
three times that for organic or rBST-free milk.  Additionally, we found consumers do not 
                                                          
7 The results are based on the assumption that consumers currently assume there is a 50/50 chance (or mix) 
of buying cloned and non-cloned milk.  If, instead, we assume consumers currently believe there is a 40/60 
chance (or mix) of buying cloned and non-cloned milk, then the total estimated annual benefit are 
approximately $1.413 billion, $432 million, and $6.909 billion for scenarios 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  If 
instead we assume that consumers believe there is a 60/40 chance of buying from cloned and non-cloned 
milk, then the estimated aggregate annual benefits are $707 million, $1.178 billion, and $9.656 billion for 
scenarios 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  The estimated benefits are not particularly sensitive to our assumptions 





differentiate between milk from a clone and milk from the offspring of a clone, a result 
that is important in considering the desirability of future labeling schemes. Our results 
also suggest that consumers would value a mandatory labeling system.  We are not aware 
of any studies on the costs of a mandatory labeling system for cloned cattle.  At the 
current time, a label might not be prohibitively costly as only a few thousand clone cows 
are thought to be in existence; however, as technology progresses and the number of 
clones increases, the cost of a labeling system is likely to increase as well.   Given these 
arguments, our assessment is that the labeling scenario 2 is most reflective of current 
realities.  In this scenario, we assumed that there was no cloned milk currently being sold 
although consumers were assumed to be uncertain of whether this was truly the case.  If 
retailers respond to a mandatory labeling policy by revealing to consumers that no cloned 
milk is in the market place with labels like, “milk from cows that have not been cloned,” 
the value of this information to consumers is $0.19 per choice occasion or about $746 
million annually in aggregate. 
 There are a number of interesting areas for future research.  First, it would be 
instructive to conduct non-hypothetical experiments to determine whether willingness-to-
pay for cloned vs. non-cloned milk increases or decreases when real money and real milk 
is on the line.  Secondly, this paper focused primarily on whether consumers stated 
preferences could be combined with revealed preferences so as to obtain a more accurate 
estimate of the value of labeling policies related to cloning, but we did not delve into 
issues related to why consumers may be concerned about cloning technology.  Finally, 
some of our analysis suggests a strong relationship between concern for cloning and 




of the organic milk market is sufficient to ameliorate consumer and retailers calls for bans 




Figure III-1. Example choice question presented to survey respondents












cloned animal Option D 
Fat Content Whole Whole Skim 
If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
milk from this 
store 
Price per Gallon $5.99 $2.99 $2.99 
rbSt Use no rBST used no rBST used no rBST used 





 Figure III-2.  Relationship between parameters from revealed and stated 











































Table III-1.  Descriptive Statistics from Revealed Preference,  







  Fat Free $4.52 0.218 
  Low Fat (1%) $4.42 0.153 
  Reduced Fat (2%) $3.98 0.377 
  Whole $4.63 0.214 
   
Organic  
  
  Fat Free $8.63 0.011 
  Low Fat (1%) $7.61 0.007 
  Reduced Fat (2%) $8.75 0.012 




Table III-2. Multinomial Logit  Estimates for Stated 
Preference (SP) and Revealed Preferences (RP) Data 




















































Log-Likelihood -16879.7 -712.41 -17636.54 
# Parameters 8 5 10 
# Obs. 16832 1052 17884 
Note: Asterisk (*) represents statistical significance at 
the 5% level or lower 
aNumbers in parenthesis are standard errors 
bThe scale of the SP data set is set equal to 1; the 















SP -8307.55a -28710.09 -8310.03a 
RP -530.38 -302.74 -326.85 
Pooled -8837.93 -29012.83 -8636.88 
  
  
Mean Squared Error 
 
 
SP 0.147a 0.302 0.147a 
RP 0.044 0.022 0.024 
Pooled 0.136a 0.271 0.134a 
  
 
% Correctly Predicted 
 
 
SP 52.4% 37.9% 52.4% 
RP 70.8% 71.2% 71.9% 
Pooled 53.5% 39.9% 53.6% 
aIndicates that means in the same row with the same 





Table III-4. Willingness-To-Pay for 
Selected Milk Attributes from Pooled SP-
RP Model 
Willingness-to-pay ($/gallon) for . . . 
Non-clone vs. cloned $4.71 
(0.112)a 
Non-cloned vs. offspring of clone $4.95 
(0.115) 




No rBST vs. rBST $1.46 
(0.067) 
Organic vs. non-organic $1.51 
(0.161) 
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors 







PREFERENCE REVERSALS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
PREFERENCES FOR ANIMAL CLONING POLICIES  
 
Introduction 
Economists often study consumer choice for the purpose of drawing inferences about the 
merits of government intervention.  Examples include the study of consumer choice to 
determine the benefits of food labeling policies (e.g., Dhar and Foltz 2005; Teisl, 
Bockstael, and Levy 2001; Hu, Veeman, and Adamowicz 2006; Rousu et al. 2007), the 
benefits of banning certain technologies or food attributes (e.g., Lusk, Norwood, and 
Pruitt 2006; Lusk et al. 2005), and the use of provision of safer food (Buzby, Ready, and 
Skees 1995; Hayes et al. 1995; Piggott and Marsh 2004).  A key characteristic of such 
studies is that they use data on consumers’ private choices about which products they 
bought for themselves to infer the merits of a public policy.  Underlying such an 
approach is an implicit assumption that consumers’ preferences for food attributes are 
stable in the sense that they would also explain which policies consumers would prefer 
the government enact.  But, are people’s preferences reflected in private shopping choices 
consistent with their preferences for public policies?  There are several reasons to suggest 




 Hamilton, Sunding, and Zilberman (2003) argued that even though someone may 
be unwilling to buy a product, they might be unwilling to vote to ban it because they do 
not want to constrain their future choices.  Voting to ban a product implies giving up the 
option to change one’s mind when more information becomes available.  Just as 
consumers might be unwilling to constrain their own future choices, they might also be 
unwilling to constrain others’ choices either out of a sense of pluralism or altruism.  
Consumers may be unwilling to impose their beliefs on others or they may believe that 
other consumers will be happier if left to make their own choices – even if they are not 
the ones the individual would make themselves.  Regardless of whether motivated by 
selfish option-value or by other-regarding preferences, these arguments would suggest 
that public support for public policies to ban controversial food products is less 
pronounced than what people’s private shopping choices would imply. 
 By contrast, Carlsson, Frykblom, and Lagerkvist (2007) argue that people might 
be more likely to vote on a product ban than would be implied by their shopping choices 
because a ban serves to eliminate free-riding.  Stated differently, if an externality exists, 
people might be willing to vote to ban a product that they currently purchase; a ban forces 
people to coordinate their purchases and eliminates the potential for free-riding.  Some 
people carry this sort of argument to its extreme arguing that there are moral reasons for 
banning the sale of certain products.  In such cases, it is argued that policy should 
prohibit others’ from buying a product because it “goes against nature” or is not “what 
God intended.”   
Each of the preceding arguments accept the premise that people’s underlying food 




their individual food choice that cause them to evaluate public policies differently than 
their individual purchases.  That is, preferences for one’s future self, preferences for 
others, or preferences for externalities can help explain why people might choose one 
thing in a grocery store and another thing in the voting booth.  An all-together different 
hypothesis is that people’s preferences somehow change when they enter the voting 
booth.  Blamey, Common, and Quiggin (1995) argue that we have two selves: a 
consumer and a citizen.  The argument is that when we are in “consumer mode” we think 
about our own private costs and benefits, but when we are in “citizen mode,” we are more 
ethical and public-minded.  What we want depends on the role we believe ourselves to be 
playing.  The voting-as-a citizen hypothesis suggests people would be more likely to 
support public policies, such as a product ban, than their private shopping choices would 
suggest.      
 The purpose of this paper is to determine whether people’s private preferences, as 
expressed through individual shopping choices, are consistent with their preferences for 
public policy.  In particular, we ask whether people’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a 
policy to ban the use of cloning technology in meat and milk production can be inferred 
from people’s choices of the types of meat and milk they prefer to buy.  The topic of 
animal cloning is of particular interest given the U.S Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA)’s recent conclusion on the safety of meat and milk from cloned animals.  
Although producers were requested to voluntarily keep cloned animals from entering the 
food supply chain in the near term, the FDA’s announcement marked the beginning of 
the process which could potentially lead to food from clones.  This prospect has not been 




intention to prohibit the sales of products from cloned animals, and other groups called 
for federal policies to ban cloned products all together.   
 This paper moves beyond previous research in a number of ways.  First, previous 
research on animal cloning has merely asked consumers their intentions to purchase 
products from cloned animals (IFIC, 2008).  The current study aims to estimate 
consumers’ WTP for meat and milk products from cloned animals.  Unlike Hamilton, 
Sunding, and Zilberman (2003) who use stated, open-ended questions to determine WTP 
for pesticide-free foods and for pesticide reduction policies, the current paper uses the 
well-established choice experiment framework in which people answer a series of 
discrete choice purchasing questions from which marginal rates of substitution between 
attributes can be estimated.  Moreover, our approach allows for a direct comparison 
between WTP for a policy calculated using consumer’s private choices as compared to 
WTP implied from a direct dichotomous choice question about the policy.   
 
Data and Methods 
In June 2008, a web-based survey was delivered to participants in the Knowledge 
Networks (KN) panel. The KN panel consists of individuals recruited using random digit 
dialing techniques, and as such, represents a true probability sample based on the general 
U.S. population.  To ensure representativeness, individuals are provided with access to 
the internet if the household does not have availability. Thus, the panel is comprised of 
both internet and non-internet households.  The survey was sent to 3,222 individuals, 
2,256 of whom completed at least a portion of the questions, implying a response rate of 




in this paper.  All subjects were provided information about cloning technology (the exact 
information statement is provided in appendix B).  To help control for a “shock” effect 
from hearing about a potentially new technology, one half of the sample received the 
information one week prior to taking the survey and the other half received it only at the 
time the survey was taken.  Because we found virtually identical results across the two 
treatments, the data is pooled in all the analysis reported here.  
 Table IV-1 reports the means for selected demographic variables and for other 
variables used in the analysis.  A total of 1,787 of the respondents answered all of the 
demographic questions.  Thus, models that incorporate demographics rely on the sub-set 
of 1,787 individuals who provided complete demographic information.  Overall, the 
sample is diverse and matches up well with the U.S. population.  Approximately 49% of 
respondents were females and the average age was 49 years.  Approximately 31% of the 
respondents had a bachelor’s degree or higher and over 68% were the primary shopper 
for their household.  
 The survey included a number of questions intended to tease out factors that 
might cause divergence in public and private questions.  Three attitudinal questions were 
administered where respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement.  The statements included: 1) “Some of the meat currently 
sold in grocery stores is from cloned animals or their offspring,” 2) “The average 
American is willing to eat meat from cloned animals,” and 3) “I trust the U.S. 
government to properly regulate the use of animal cloning. Participants were asked to 
respond to each statement on a five point scale: 1= strongly disagree, 2= somewhat 




first question provides information on people’s beliefs about the extent of market 
penetration of cloning and thus relates to people’s beliefs about what they are currently 
consuming and the impacts of a potential ban on products from clones.  The second 
question was included to provide information on people’s beliefs about others’ 
preferences; presumably some people might vote differently than their private shopping 
choices suggest because they do not want to impose their beliefs on others.  Finally, the 
last question aims to determine people’s beliefs about the efficacy of government 
policies, which is of relation to people’s willingness to support regulation.   
 We also hypothesized that differences in beliefs about the morality of animal 
cloning might explain differences in public and private choices; those who believe animal 
cloning is morally wrong are more likely to be willing to enact a ban.  To determine 
consumers’ potential objections to cloning on the basis of morality, respondents were 
asked a series of paired-comparison questions to determine the relative importance of 
competing objections to animal cloning (including morality).  They were asked “Which 
of the following two statements best describes your views towards animal cloning? X or 
Y.” A total of eight different issues were included in survey. Responses were analyzed 
using a random parameters logit to determine the relative probability of the eight 
different issues best reflecting people’s views on animal cloning. Here, we focus in on the 
relative importance an individual attached to the statement “Animal cloning is morally 
wrong.” As show in table 1, the average score for this variable was 0.081, which means 
that on average there is an 8.1% chance the respondent’s would chose “Animal cloning is 
morally wrong” as the most important objection in relation to cloning.  More details on 




Public WTP for a Ban on Meat and Milk from Clones 
To directly determine consumers’ public preferences for a ban on meat and milk from 
cloned animals, they were asked to respond to the following contingent valuation 
question:  
Suppose the next time you went to vote, there was a referendum on the ballot that 
would ban the practice of animal cloning altogether. Would you vote in favor of 
this policy if the policy would increase the price you would pay for meat and milk 
products by Z% due to the added enforcement and oversight required by the 
policy? 
Response categories were of the form: “I would vote in favor of a ban and a Z% 
increase in the price of meat and milk” or “I would vote against the ban and the Z% 
increase in the price of meat and milk.” Each respondent was randomly assigned a value 
for Z%  among the values of 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100%.   Answers to this 
question provide a direct estimate of people’s public WTP for that policy to ban animal 
cloning. 
 
Private WTP for a ban on Meat and Milk from Clones 
The survey contained a series of discrete choice questions asking respondents which milk 
or ground beef option (or none) they would buy when grocery shopping. In constructing 
the questions, standard practice in the choice experiment literature were followed.  Each 
choice option was described by a set of attributes or characteristics.  Milk options were 
described with four different attributes including price per gallon ($2.99/lb or $5.99), fat 




cloning (milk from non-cloned animal, milk from cloned animal, or milk from offspring 
of cloned animal.) A separate set of questions asked about preferences for buying ground 
beef, where each option differed by price per pound ($1.99/lb or $3.99/lb), percent lean 
(80%, or 90%), percent saturated fat (5% or 10%), and use of cloning (beef from non-
cloned animal, beef from cloned animal, or beef from offspring of cloned animal). The 
purpose of including several additional attributes other than price and cloning was to 
present realistic choice options to consumers like the ones they would encounter in the 
supermarket and to determine the importance of cloning relative to these other attributes.   
The choice questions were constructed such that the cloning attribute was treated 
as an alternative-specific; option A was always “milk (meat) from non-cloned animal,” 
option B, was always “milk (meat) from cloned animal,” and option C was always “milk 
(meat) from offspring of cloned animal.” Option D was a “no purchase” option that 
stated, “If options A, B, and C were all that was available when shopping at my local 
grocery store, I would not purchase milk (ground beef) from this store.”  An orthogonal 
main effects fractional factorial design was used to determine which milk (ground beef) 
options to present to respondents.  For the milk questions, price and rBST were varied at 
two levels each and fat content was varied at four levels, making 22 x 4 = 16 possible 
combinations of milk options that could be created.  Because there were three milk 
options in each choice set, there were 163 = 4,096 possible choice sets that could be 
constructed.  From this full factorial, 16 choice tasks were selected such that the 
correlations between attributes, both within and across options, were exactly zero.  Each 
respondent answered 16 milk conjoint choice questions, an example of which is shown in 




varied at two levels each so there were 23 = 8 possible combinations of beef options that 
could be created. Because there were three beef options in each choice set, there were 83 
= 512 possible choice sets that could be constructed.  From this full factorial, 12 choice 
tasks were selected such that the correlations between attributes, both within and across 
options, were exactly zero.  Each respondent answered 12 beef conjoint choice questions, 
an example of which is shown in figure IV-2. 
 Responses to these choice experiment questions can be used to estimate an 
attribute-based utility function, which in turn can be used to calculate the private welfare 
effects of policies such as a ban on cloned milk and ground beef.  The exact procedures 
used to calculate consumer WTP for a ban on meat and milk from clones based on the 
answers to these choice question is described later in the text. 
 
Econometric Methods 
Public WTP (Contingent Valuation Question) 
In the contingent valuation question, participants directly voted either in favor or against 
a policy to ban cloning in meat and milk production assuming that it would increase the 
price they would pay for meat or milk products by an amount Z%.  An interval-censored 
model is used to estimate mean WTP to ban animal cloning (Cameron and James 1987; 
Cameron 1988).  In particular, individual i’s public willingness-to-pay (P!5) can be 
written as: 
(4.1) P!5  ?@A  !    
where ?@ is the vector of explanatory variables for individual i , A is the vector of 




mean zero and variance :#.  Each individual was confronted with a randomly chosen 
percent increase in price, Z%.  The survey responses identify a range on WTP*. If the 
individual votes in favor of the ban, then we know that P!5  !, where ! is the 
randomly assigned price increase assigned to individual i.  However, if the individual 
votes against the ban, P!5  !.  Accordingly, the following likelihood functions can 
be used to estimate the determinants of WTP: 
(4.2) log p  ∑ slogΦ  61?@A3 ¡,!$%  1  s!
JIW ¢1  £  61?@A3 ¡¤ 
where yi = 1 if the individual voted in favor of the policy at price Zi and 0 otherwise, Φ is 
the standard normal cumulative distribution function and the coefficient estimates, A, can 
be interpreted as the marginal effect of ?@ on P!5 (Cameron 1988).  Mean willingness-
to-pay can then be calculated as   ¥WTP
  ?̈A© where ?̈ is a vector of sample averages 
of the independent variable. If one is only interested in the location and scale of the 
willingness-to-pay in the sample, equation (4.1) can be estimated with only a constant as 
an explanatory variable. The estimated constant is the mean WTP for the policy.   
Our question was phrased such that it asked whether people were willing to pay a 
particular percentage price increase.  Thus, estimates from equation (4.2) are in terms of 
percentage price increases people are WTP.  To make a direct comparison to the private 
choice questions, the percentage WTP needs to be converted to a dollar amount that 
would make consumers indifferent between banning cloning and not banning cloning.  In 
June 2008, when the survey was conducted, uncooked ground beef was approximately 
$3.01 per pound (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008)  and retail prices for milk were 
$3.75 per gallon for whole milk (USDA, 2008). Thus, we can re-estimate equation (4.2), 
and replace Zi with !  1  !




In this case, the statistic reveals the extra dollar amount people are willing to pay per 
pound of ground beef or gallon of milk for the ban assuming the same quantity is 
consumed after the ban.  Although this latter assumption may be somewhat dubious, it is 
somewhat immaterial in relation to our key finding.  We find that differences in public 
and private WTP for a ban are not differences in the magnitude of WTP, but rather of a 
reversal in preference for the ban.  
 
Private WTP (Choice Experiment Questions)  
Responses to the choice experiment questions regarding which meat or milk option (or 
none) a consumer would buy when grocery shopping can be used to estimate an attribute-
based utility function, which in turn can be used to calculate the private preferences for 
policies such as a ban on cloned milk and ground beef.  Responses can be analyzed by 
using the random utility framework of McFadden (1973). In particular, individual i’s 
utility for choice option j, C!', is defined by a systematic component (D!') assumed to 
depend on the attributes of the choice option (i.e. price, fat content) and a stochastic error 
term -!'
 representing consumers’ idiosyncrasies unobservable to the analyst: 
(4.3) C!'  D!'  -!' 
If the error term in equation (4.3) are independently and identically distributed with a 
type I extreme value distribution, then the probability of alternative j being chosen out of 
a set of J alternatives is the familiar multinomial logit model (MNL): 
(4.4) !'  Proboption b is chosen
  gi6j∑ gi6klkmn  
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!' is the price faced by individual i for alternative j, the ’s and &’s are the 
marginal utilities for the milk and beef attributes, respectively, and the remaining 
variables are dummy variables indicating the presence/absence of the characteristic in 
question. The utility of the “clone” option is normalized to zero for identification 
purposes, and therefore, R, T,  and U (&L, &M, and &R) represent the utility of having a 
gallon of milk (pound of ground beef) from a non-cloned, offspring of a cloned animal, 
or not purchasing at all relative to purchasing milk (ground beef) from a cloned animal on 
the particular shopping occasion. To facilitate comparison with the results of the “direct” 
question on WTP for a ban, equations (4.5) and (4.6) can be re-specified from 
“preference space” to “WTP space” following the approach in Scarpa, Thiene, and Train 
(2008).  Marginal WTP for an attribute is the attribute’s coefficient divided by the 
negative of the price coefficient.  For example, WTP for whole milk relative to skim milk 
is equal to #/%.  Equations (4.5) and (4.6) can be re-written in WTP space as follows: 
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where ² and ok are consumer WTP for attribute k (i.e., ²  /%). 
 Our overall goal is not to estimate the marginal WTP for cloning per se, but rather 
to calculate the consumers’ WTP for a ban on animal cloning using the preference 
functions given in equations (4.7) and (4.8), which are determined by people’s private 
shopping choices. In particular, we can use the estimated utility functions to calculate 
consumers’ expected maximum utility in a world without the ban where there is some 
chance that consumers might buy ground beef or milk products from cloned animals and 
compare it to the expected maximum utility in a post-ban world in which animal cloning 
has been banned and there is no chance of buying ground beef or milk products from 
cloned animals.  
 To set up the pre-ban scenario, we assume that consumers believe there is 
currently a 50/50 chance of purchasing ground beef or milk products from cloned animals 
when buying ground beef or milk.8 For example, when a consumer purchases a pound of 
ground beef they believe there is a 50% chance of buying meat from a cloned animal and 
a 50% chance that it is from a non-cloned animal.  Our simulation assumes that when 
purchasing a gallon of milk, consumers have five choices: whole, 2%, 1%, or skim milk 
(all assumed with no rBST at a price of $3.75 per gallon), and an option to not purchase. 
When purchasing a pound of ground beef, our simulation assumes consumers have three 
choices: 80% or 90% lean (both assumed to have 7.5% saturated fat and cost $3.01 per 
                                                          
8 Currently there is no way to track meat or milk from cloned animals or their offspring, and thus most 
consumers are unaware whether the meat or milk they purchase is from cloned animals. In fact, in the 
survey we asked respondents whether they thought products from cloned beef were already sold in the 
grocery store and about 60% indicated they did not know.  Such results suggest that in the current market 
environment, most people are uncertain whether the meat or milk they are purchasing is from cloned 
animals.  Given this level of uncertainty, we assumed in our policy simulations that that consumers 
currently believe they have a 50/50 chance of purchasing meat or milk from a clone and non-cloned animal 




pound), and an option to not purchase. Because we assume in the pre-ban world that 
consumers perceive a 50/50 chance of purchasing ground beef or milk from a cloned 
animal, their utility for each meat or milk option is a weighted average of the non-cloned 
utility coefficient shown in equations (4.7) and (4.8) (i.e., 0.5²R or 0.5oL; recall the utility 
of cloned has been normalized to zero).  In effect, we assume that when the consumers go 
to the grocery store to buy ground beef or milk they believe that half is from cloned cattle 
and the other half is from non-cloned cattle, and not being able to tell which is which, the 
expected utility of an option is given by the probability of observing cloned times the 
utility of getting cloned.   
 In the post-ban world, consumers can be assured all meat/milk is from non-cloned 
animals.  We assume consumers still face the same five choices when purchasing a gallon 
of milk and the same three choices when purchasing a pound of ground beef as in the pre-
ban world, the only difference is that now they know the meat/milk products are from 
non-cloned animal (i.e., 0.5²R is replaced with ²R and 0.5oL is replaced with oL).  
Consumers’ WTP for a ban on animal cloning based on their private meat and milk 
purchases is calculated by comparing consumers’ expected maximum utility in the pre- 
and post-ban worlds, and dividing by the marginal utility of income.  In particular, 
consumers’ projected WTP for a ban (per choice of meat or milk option) is: 
(4.9)  PF!³g  1/´µln ∑ >6k¶·$% ¡  ln ∑ >6k¶·$% ¡] 
where  D! is defined in equation (4.7) for the milk purchases and equation (4.8) for the 
beef purchases, and where ´ is the marginal utility of income given by % for milk and 






Table IV-2 reports the multinomial logit estimates fit to the private, choice experiment 
data as well as the interval censored regressions fit to the public, contingent valuation 
data.  Looking first at the private choices, the estimates reveal that, as expected, 
consumers dislike price increases as indicated by the negative price coefficient.  For 
ground beef, consumers are WTP about $0.048 for each 1% increase in leanness and are 
WTP $0.152 for each 1% reduction in saturated fat content.  For milk, skim is preferred 
over whole or 1% milk, but 2% is preferred to skim.  Consumers also prefer rBST-free 
milk to milk containing rBST.  For both milk and ground beef, products from non-cloned 
animals are strongly preferred over products from cloned animals.  For example, 
consumers are willing to pay a $3.46 premium for a one pound package of ground beef 
from a non-clone as compared to a clone, and consumers are willing to pay a $3.40 
premium for one gallon of milk from a non-clone as compared to a clone. Consumers do 
not differentiate much between products from offspring of cloned animals and the clones 
themselves.  The results also indicate that people would rather purchase milk from cloned 
animals than not purchasing at all, but the reverse is true for ground beef.  
 The estimated preference parameters from the private choices can be substituted 
into equation (4.9) to determine the implied WTP to ban ground beef or milk from 
clones.  The results indicate that, based on consumers’ private shopping choices, 
consumers are WTP $1.73/lb for ground beef and $1.70/gallon for milk to ban products 
from cloned animals, respectively, each time they purchase the products.9   
                                                          
9 The calculations assume consumers currently believe there is a 50/50 chance of buying cloned and non-
cloned meat and milk.  If consumers instead believe there was a 60/40 chance of purchasing non-cloned vs. 
cloned products, then they would be willing to pay an additional $1.38/lb and $1.36/gallon each time they 




Table IV-2 also reports the results from the interval censored regression fit to the 
contingent valuation question in which consumers were directly asked about their WTP 
to ban meat and milk from clones.  The results reveal that consumers are notWTP for a 
ban on cloned products.  In fact, the data indicates that ground beef prices would have to 
fall by $0.78/lb and milk prices would have to fall by $0.98/gallon for people to be 
indifferent to the ban.  Our results indicate a preference reversal: people’s private choices 
imply they want one thing whereas their public voting preferences imply they want 
another.   
 The question now is why people exhibit differences in preferences when making 
private vs. public choices.  Given the direction of the reversal (people were less 
supportive of the ban in the public voting question than in their private choices), we can 
rule out two possible explanations mentioned previously in the introduction.  First, 
consumers apparently do not believe there is an externality or public good that would 
cause higher support for a ban than private choices would imply.  Secondly, consumers 
are apparently not voting as citizens.  Voting as a citizen would tend to cause someone to 
be more likely to vote in favor of public policies than their private choices would suggest, 
which is exactly the opposite of what we observed.   
 To delve into this issue more deeply, we re-ran the regressions reported in table 2 
to investigate how demographics and beliefs affected WTP for a ban on cloned products.  
For the public preference, contingent valuation questions, this task is easily accomplished 
by adding demographic variables linearly into the interval censored regression.  For the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
buying non-cloned vs. cloned products, they would pay an additional $2.08/lb for ground beef and 
$2.04/gallon for milk each time they purchased to ban animal cloning.  Even if consumers believe there is 
currently no chance of buying cloned meat/milk, the implied WTP from the private choices is zero, which 




private choice, questions, we modified equations (4.7) and (4.8) and specified the “Non-
cloned vs. Cloned” variable as a function of demographic and attitudinal variables.  In 
particular, the coefficients from equations (4.7) and (4.8), ²R and oL, then become: 
²R   ?@¸
 and oR  ?@¹
, where ?@ is a vector of demographic, belief, and attitudinal 
question variables for individual i, and ¸ and ¹ are the vectors of parameters.  The 
demographic variables included age, gender, income level, education level, region, and 
whether or not they were the primary shopper for their households’ food products. Four 
belief questions, previously described, were included in the regression along with 
variables indicating how often the respondent purchased meat or purchase milk.  
 Models incorporating demographics and beliefs are reported in Table IV-3.  
Results reveal that females are WTP $0.33 more to avoid ground beef from cloned 
animals compared to males, but by contrast males are WTP $0.20 more to avoid milk 
from cloned animals compared to females.  Results from the contingent valuation data 
reveal that females are WTP $1.18 and $1.47 more for beef and milk, respectively for a 
ban on animal cloning than are males.   
Consumers who agree that meat from cloned animals is currently sold in the 
grocery store are WTP about $0.13 less for ground beef and $0.19 less for milk from 
cloned animals than those who do not believe the statement.  This statement however has 
no significant effect on their WTP for a ban.  The statements that “the average American 
is willing to eat meat from cloned animals” and “I trust the U.S. government to properly 
regulate the use of animal cloning,” significantly affect private and public WTP; however 
the magnitudes of the effects are much higher for the WTP for the ban.  A one-unit 




$1.63 to $2.03 for the ban but only $0.35 and $0.34 for purchases of meat or milk, 
respectively, from a non-cloned animal.  Consumers that believe that animal cloning is 
morally wrong are WTP significantly more for products from non-cloned animals and to 
ban animal cloning.  Again, a one-unit change in the morality variable has a much more 
pronounced effect on WTP for a ban as compared to WTP for products from non-cloned 
animals compared to cloned animals.  These estimates suggest that certain demographics 
and beliefs affect the differences between private and public preferences.   
 To illustrate the relationship between public WTP for a ban and private WTP to 
avoid cloned products, figure IV-3 plots each consumer’s predicted WTP resulting from 
the regression equations shown in table IV-3.10  A majority of the people favor a ban on 
animal cloning based on private shopping choices, but only four consumers are projected 
to vote against the ban based on private shopping choices. The figure clearly shows that 
the two preferences (public and private) are positively correlated, but the line is shifted 
downward and is steeper than what would be implied by a 45-degree line coming from 
the origin.    
One interesting question that arises is whether there are significant differences 
between the types of people who reverse preferences and those that do not.  Recall that 
the private choices predicted that practically everyone (all but four people) would vote in 
favor of a ban.  However, the public choices indicated that only 40.29% would vote in 
favor (i.e., their predicted WTP is greater than zero) and 59.71% would vote against (i.e., 
their predicted WTP is less than zero).   Table IV-4 compares the two groups of 
consumers: those who reversed their preferences and those that did not.  A majority of 
females (63%) were consistent in their preferences and did not reverse preferences; by 
                                                          




contrast, most men (61%) voted against the cloning ban when their private shopping 
choices implied they would prefer it.  Those people who expressed preference reversals 
were more likely to agree that the average American is willing to eat meat from cloned 
animals compared to those that vote for the ban (3.29 vs. 2.09, respectively), suggesting 
people’s votes are sensitive to how they believe it will affect others.  Those expressing 
preference reversals were also more likely to trust the government to regulate the use of 
animal cloning and purchased meat and milk more often than those that vote for the ban 
based on public choices (3.24 vs. 1.69, 4.15 vs. 3.05, and 3.92 vs. 3.65, respectively).  
People who were consistent in their private and public choices were much more likely to 
believe morality is a concern with cloning than were those who voted against.   
 
Conclusions 
This study sought to determine whether people’s private preferences, as expressed 
through individual shopping choices, are consistent with their preferences for public 
policy.  Choice experiments regarding which meat or milk option (or none) a consumer 
would buy when grocery shopping were used to measure private preferences while a 
contingent valuation question focused on a ban on the practice of animal cloning was 
used to measure public preferences.  The current study found a preference reversal: 
whereas private shopping choices imply people are WTP to ban cloned meat and milk, 
when directly asked, most people would demand compensation were a ban actually 
enacted.  Private choices implied that practically everyone would favor a ban, however 




The results reveal an inadequacy in the conceptual approach used to translate 
preferences expressed in private shopping situations into preferences in public policy.  In 
particular, people apparently have beliefs and preferences about the policy itself that need 
be taken into consideration.  Our results are not supportive of the notion that the 
differences in public and private choices are a result of people “voting like a citizen” in 
contingent valuation questions nor do they support the notion that people believe there to 
be large externalities associated with cloning technology.  The results are more consistent 
with the hypothesis that, when evaluating the merits of public policy, people are sensitive 
to the impacts on other consumers and want to have the option to adjust their beliefs as 
more information becomes available.  In addition, beliefs about the morality of cloning 










































Table IV-1. Characteristics of Survey Respondents (n=1787)a 
Variable Definition Mean 
Age age in years 49.56 
Gender 1 if female; 0 if male 0.485 
Income1 1 if annual household income <$25,000; 0 otherwise 0.180 
Income2 1 if annual household income $25,000 to $99,999; 0 otherwise 0.661 
Income3 1 if annual household income ≥ $100,000; 0 otherwise 0.159 
Bachelors 1 if Bachelor's degree or higher; 0 otherwise 0.311 
Northeast 1 if resides in Northeast U.S Census Region; 0 otherwise 0.174 
Midwest 1 if resides in Midwest U.S Census Region; 0 otherwise 0.231 
South 1 if resides in South U.S Census Region; 0 otherwise 0.368 
West 1 if resides in West U.S Census Region; 0 otherwise 0.227 
Primary Shopper 1 if primary shopper for household's food products; 0 otherwise 0.681 
Some of the meat currently sold in grocery 
stores is from cloned animals or their offspring 
1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agreeb 2.790 
The average American is willing to eat meat 
from cloned animals 
1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree b 2.811 
I trust the U.S. government to properly regulate 
the use of animal cloning 
1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree b 2.621 
Morals  0.081 
Meat Purchasec How often meat is purchased per month 3.700 
Milk Purchasec How often milk is  purchased per month 3.813 
aUsed the 1,787 respondents that answered all demographic and attitudinal questions . 
bResponse to question, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?” Response categories were: 1=strongly 
disagree, 2= somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=somewhat agree, and 5=strongly agree. 
cResponse to question: Approximately how often do you purchase meat (milk)? 1=Never, 2=a few times a year, 3= about once a month, 4=about 
once a week, 5=every day. The responses were converted to a monthly consumption basis using the following; never purchased=0, a few times a 





Table IV-2. Comparison of WTP for a Ban on Ground Beef and Milk from Clones from Private and Public Choices  
 Ground Beef  Milk 




 Private                      
Choicesa 














Price -0.645*c -0.645*   -0.420* -0.420*  
 (0.012)d (0.012)   (0.007) (0.007)  
Leanness 0.031* 0.048*      
 (0.002) (0.004)      
Saturated Fat  -0.098* -0.152*      
Content (0.004) (0.008)      
Whole vs skim      -0.203* -0.483*  
     (0.025) (0.060)  
1% vs. skim      -0.136* -0.323*  
     (0.026) (0.062)  
2% vs. skim      0.281* 0.700*  
     (0.025) (0.060)  
rBST Free     0.626* 1.493*  
     (0.019) (0.049)  
Non-cloned vs.  2.229* 3.458*   1.430* 3.403*  
Cloned (0.026) (0.065)   (0.020) (0.065)  
Cloned offspring  0.320* 0.496*   -0.143* -0.342*  
vs. Cloned (0.030) (0.048)   (0.025) (0.060)  
None vs. Cloned 0.512* 0.795*   -1.028* -2.451*  
 (0.201) (0.315)   (0.038) (0.067)  
Intercept   -0.783*    -0.976* 
   (0.390)    (0.486) 
Scale   5.901* 
(1.050) 






Table IV-2. Continued 
 Ground Beef  Milk 




 Private                      
Choicesa 




























        
LLF -20080.50 -20080.50 -1185.92  -32820.00 -32820.00 -1185.92 
# of Choices 21,900 21,900 1,825  29,200 29,200 1,825 
# Respondents 1,825 1,825 1,825  1,825 1,825 1,825 
aEstimates from multinomial logit model fit to the conjoint-choice data  
bEstimates from interval censored regression model fit to the contingent valuation choice data  
cOne asterisk represents statistical significance at the p=0.05 level or lower 
dNumbers in parentheses are standard errors 
e95% confidence interval for the mean WTP determined by parametric bootstrapping is [1.662, 1.790]. 
f95% confidence interval for the mean WTP is [-1.563, -0.003]. 
g95% confidence interval for the mean WTP determined by parametric bootstrapping is [1.635, 1.765]. 





Table IV-3. Comparison of the Effects of Individual-Specific Attitudes and 
Characteristics on WTP for Non-Cloned vs. Cloned Ground Beef and Milk from Private 
and Public Choices 


























    
Saturated Fat Content -0.151* 
(0.007) 
    
Whole vs. skim    -0.455* 
(0.061) 
 
1% vs skim    -0.302* 
(0.062) 
 
2% vs skim    0.704* 
(0.060) 
 
rBST Free    -1.496* 
(0.049) 
 
Cloned offspring vs cloned 0.471* 
(0.046) 
  -0.340* 
(0.060) 
 
None vs cloned 0.599* 
(0.310) 
  -2.464* 
(0.068) 
 
Determinants of Preferences for  
Non-Cloned vs. Clones 
   














































Bachelor or higher vs. less 




























Table IV-3. Continued 





































Agree “Some of the meat 
currently sold in grocery 
stores is from cloned animals 









Agree “The average 
American is willing to eat 










“I trust the U.S. government 


































Scale  5.023 
(0.845) 
  6.258 
(1.053) 
# of Choices 21,444 1,787  28,592 1,787 
# of Respondents 1,787 1,787  1,787 1,787 
aEstimates from multinomial logit model fit to the conjoint-choice data with the “Non-cloned vs. Cloned” 
variable a function of demographic and attitudinal variables 
bEstimates from interval censored regression model fit to the contingent valuation choice data with 
demographic variables added linearly 
cOne asterisk represents statistical significance at the p=0.05 level or lower 





Table IV-4. Comparison of Consumers Predicted to Vote Consistently between 






Percent Predicted to vote in favor based 
on Private Choices 
40.29% 59.49%  
Mean Age 49.6 49.49 0.886 
Female 62.92% 38.95% <0.001 
Male 37.08% 61.05%  
Income < $25,000 22.36% 15.05%  
Income $25,000 to $100,000 67.36% 65.29% <0.001 
Income > $100,000 10.28% 19.66%  
Less than Bachelors degree 76.25% 64.16% <0.001 
Bachelors degree or Higher 23.75% 35.84%  
Northeast Region 16.94% 17.69%  
Midwest Region 21.81% 23.89% 0.424 
South Region 39.17% 35.37%  
West Region 22.09% 23.05%  
Primary Shopper 70.56% 66.32% 0.060 
Agree “Some of the meat currently sold 
in grocery stores is from cloned animals 
or their offspring” 
2.53 2.96 <0.001 
Agree: “The average American is willing 
to eat meat from cloned animals” 
2.09 3.29 <0.001 
Agree: “I trust the U.S. government to 
properly regulate the use of animal 
cloning” 
1.69 3.24 <0.001 
Morals  0.145 0.04 <0.001 
How often purchase meat 3.05 4.15 <0.001 
How often purchase milk 3.65 3.92 0.204 
# of Respondents 720 1063 <0.001 
aThere were a total of 1,787 observations.  4 observations are not included that opposed both the ban 
implied from the private choices and from the policy question. 
bConsistent voters are classified as voters who voted in favor of the ban based on both the public 
private choices. 
cInconsistent voters are classified as voters who voted against the ban based on public choices but 
voted in favor of the ban based on private choices. 










The current study examines both demand and supply issues in the bovine industry.  The 
first paper asses the most common disease among feedlot cattle in the U.S., bovine 
respiratory disease (BRD) and the potential use of serum haptoglobin (Hp) to identify the 
severity of it.  The final two papers use a survey on consumers’ preferences for animal 
cloning to address potential market impacts from cloning while also examining the 
effectiveness of the survey method.   
 Knowing BRD risk of calves entering the feedlot could potentially increase net 
revenues for stocker operations and feedlot managers.  The first essay sought to 
determine if Hp could be used as a tool for predicting BRD outbreak and the impact of 
multiple treatments for BRD.  It also sought to determine the economic effects of BRD in 
a backgrounding and finishing phases of the feedlot.  Cross-bred heifers were assigned 
pens by risk-groups according to arrival Hp concentrations (low, medium, or high).  
Heifers were monitored daily and treated for BRD during a 63-day backgrounding phase.   
Following the backgrounding phase, the heifers were assigned finishing pens according 
to the number of times they were treated for BRD.  The current essay found serum Hp 




significant impact on net returns.  However, as the number of BRD treatments increases, 
net returns decreased during the backgrounding phase and the combined backgrounding-
finishing phase.  On average, net returns were $111.12 and $143.20 less for heifers that 
were classified as chronically ill compared to those that were never treated for BRD in 
the backgrounding phase and combined phases, respectively.  This trend was not evident 
during the finishing phase alone.  The ability to predict the incidence of BRD is 
especially important.  Further studies need to be conducted to examine economic 
efficiency of using HP concentration or other predictors to predict the number of BRD 
treatments given their cost.  Knowing the propensity to contract BRD is of more value to 
the backgrounding phase but costs associated with Hp sampling exceed its expected 
predictability benefits at this time. 
 The final two essays examined different model estimation techniques used based 
on the survey of consumer’s preferences for animal cloning.  Recently the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration concluded that meat and milk from cloned animals was safe to eat 
which could potentially lead to products from cloned animals entering the market in the 
near future.  Controversy has begun to stir about this topic and many large food 
processors have announced that they will prohibit the sale of these products while some 
groups have asked for federal policy to ban animal cloning. Stated preference or 
experimental methods are necessary to determine consumer’s preferences for cloned milk 
since it is not currently labeled and sold in the market place. In particular, this study used 
a choice-experiment model in which respondents were asked a series of discrete choice 
purchasing questions in order to determine consumer’s preferences for meat and milk 




  The second essay also sought to determine whether the survey-based choices 
were consistent with people’s revealed preferences given by scanner data.  Both SP and 
RP data have weaknesses in their demand analysis; however these weaknesses can be 
overcome by combining the two data sets.  Thus, although milk from cloned cattle is not 
currently sold in the marketplace, if the preferences expressed in a SP survey (including 
the attribute of cloning) are systematically related to the preferences governing choices in 
RP data, we might be more confident in the reliability of the estimate on consumers’ 
preferences for cloning.  The current analysis suggests that a pooled model exhibits better 
overall out-of-sample prediction performance than either stated or revealed preference 
data used in isolation even though the hypothesis of common preference parameters 
across the revealed and stated preference data sets in sample was rejected.   
 Based on the pooled model, consumers are WTP large premiums to avoid milk 
from cloned animals, $4.71 per gallon, which is three times larger than their WTP for 
organic or rBST-free milk.  Consumers were also found to value a mandatory labeling 
system.  If retailers respond to a mandatory labeling policy by revealing to consumers 
that no cloned milk is in the market place with labels like, “milk from cows that have not 
been cloned,” the value of this information to consumers is $0.19 per choice occasion or 
about $746 million annually in aggregate.  Future research could be conducted to 
determine if willingness-to-pay for cloned vs. non-cloned milk increases or decreases 
when real money and real milk is on the line.  Further research could also be conducted to 
delve into issues related to why consumers may be concerned about cloning technology.  
 The third and final essay uses the discrete choice questions regarding 




while a contingent valuation question focused on a ban on the practice of animal cloning 
was used to measure public preferences.  The purpose of this essay is to determine if 
these private preferences, as expressed through individual shopping choices, are 
consistent with their preferences for public policy.  A preference reversal was found in 
the current study: whereas private shopping choices imply people are WTP to ban cloned 
meat and milk, when directly asked, most people would demand compensation were a 
ban actually enacted.  Based on consumers’ private shopping choices, consumers are 
WTP $1.73/lb for ground beef and $1.70/gallon for milk to ban products from cloned 
animals, respectively, each time they purchase the products. The results based on the 
public preferences reveal that consumers are not WTP for a ban on cloned products.  In 
fact, the data indicates that ground beef prices would have to fall by $0.78/lb and milk 
prices would have to fall by $0.98/gallon for people to be indifferent to the ban.  The 
results of the study appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that, when evaluating the 
merits of public policy, people are sensitive to the impacts on other consumers and want 
to have the option to adjust their beliefs as more information becomes available.  In 
addition, beliefs about the morality of cloning appear to play a significant role in 
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APPENDIX A-- TABLES FOR RANDOM PARAMETER LOGIT (RPL) 






Table A-1. Random Parameter Logit (RPL) 







































Organic --- 0.201 
(0.498) 
Scaleb 0.750 
Log-Likelihood -9167.16 -10038.16 
# Parameters 44 54 
# Obs. 16832 17884 
Note: Asterisk (*) represents statistical 
significance at the 5% level or lower 
aNumbers in parenthesis are standard errors 
bThe scale of the SP data set is set equal to 1; 
the estimated value refers to the scale of the 




Table A-2. Selected Correlations between Random 
Parameters in the Pooled Stated and Revealed 
Preference Model from Random Parameter Logit 
(RPL) Model 
Random Parameters Correlations 
Price (RP) vs. Price (SP) 0.99 
Whole (RP) vs. Whole (SP) 0.35 
2% fat (RP) vs. 2% fat (SP) 0.97 
1% fat (RP) vs. 1% fat (SP) 0.96 
Organic (RP) vs rBST free (SP) 0.54 




Table A-3.  Out-of-Sample Prediction 









SP -8491.05 -8723.19 
RP -487.04 -448.39 
Pooled -8968.55 -9164.15 
  
 
Mean Squared Error 
SP 0.149 0.151 
RP 0.037 0.035 
Pooled 0.136a 0.138 
 % Correctly Predicted 
SP 50.9% 51.0% 
RP 70.8% 71.0% 
Pooled 52.2% 52.3% 
aIndicates that means in the same row with 
the same superscript are not significantly 
different at P<0.05. 
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APPENDIX B –SURVEY ON CONSUMER PREFERENCES FOR CLONING 
ADMINISTERED ONLINE BY IRI AND KN 
 
The following survey was sent to IRI and KN who created an online version and 
administered it to their panel of respondents. 
 
Section 1: Most important issues when purchase food 
 
First we would like to ask you a few repeated questions regarding the importance of 
several general issues when you purchase food. For each question indicate which of the 
two issues is the most important issue to you when purchasing food.  
 
1.   Is X or Y more important when you purchase foods? 
 
[Ask 11 such questions, where the two food issues X and Y are randomly chosen from 
the list of 11 issues below.  Note 1: in total, there are (11*11-11)/2=55 possible questions 
that that can be created representing all possible combinations of pairings of the issues 
listed below. Note 2: for data collection we will need to know which two choices were 
presented to the respondent and which choice was made for each of the 11 of the 
randomly selected questions for each individual.] 
Food Issues 
1. Naturalness (extent to which food is produced without 
modern technologies) 
2. Taste (extent to which consumption of the food is appealing 
to the senses) 
3. Price (the price that is paid for the food) 
4. Safety (extent to which consumption of food will not cause 
illness) 
5. Convenience (ease with which food is cooked and/or 
consumed) 
6. Nutrition (amount and type of fat, protein, vitamins, etc.) 
7. Tradition (preserving traditional consumption patterns) 
8. Origin (where the agricultural commodities were grown) 
9. Fairness (the extent to which all parties involved in the 
production of the food equally benefit) 
10. Appearance (extent to which food looks appealing) 






Is Naturalness (extent to which food is produced without modern technologies) or Taste 
(extent to which consumption of the food is appealing to the senses) more important 
when you purchase foods? [response categories:1=Naturalness, 2=Taste].  
. 
QA11: 
Is Price (the price that is paid for the food) or Appearance (extent to which food looks 
appealing) 






Section 2: Knowledge of Animal Breeding Technologies 
 
Overall, how much have you heard or read about each of the following assisted 
reproduction technologies that are sometimes used to breed animals for meat and milk 
production? [response categories: 1 = nothing at all; 2 = a little; 3 = a moderate amount; 3 
= quite a bit; 4 = a great deal] 
 
12. Artificial Insemination 
13. In vitro fertilization 
14. Biotechnology 






Section 3: Information on Animal Cloning 
 
The next section of the survey will ask several questions specifically about animal 
cloning. What follows is a brief description of cloning.   
 
Animal cloning is a process in which scientists can copy the genetic or inherited traits of 
an animal. Clones are similar to identical twins only born at different times. Similar to in 
vitro fertilization, cloned animals begin in a laboratory, but then are born to surrogate 
mothers in the usual way and grow up just like other animals.  
 This reproductive breeding technique is appealing to some ranchers and farmers 
because it enables them to create “identical twins” of their best breeding stock – allowing 
them to more quickly breed desirable traits into herds.  The technique is also appealing to 
some consumers because it has the potential to lower the price and increase the quality of 
meat and milk. 
 This reproductive breeding technique is opposed by some people on moral and 
ethical grounds.  Other people are opposed to animal cloning because, given current 
technology, only a small percentage of attempts at cloning are successful and many of the 
clones die during all stages of gestation and birth and the procedures may carry risks for 
the mother.  Although these symptoms are a downside to cloning, they are not necessarily 
unique to cloning in comparison to other reproductive techniques. 
  In January 2008, after years of detailed study and analysis, the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) concluded that, “meat and milk from clones of cattle, swine, 
and goats, and the offspring of clones from any species traditionally consumed as food, 
are as safe to eat as food from conventionally bred animals.”  The FDA’s science-based 
risk assessment, which was peer-reviewed by a group of independent scientific experts in 
cloning and animal health, concluded:  
1. Cloning poses no unique risks to animal health compared to the risks found with 
other reproduction methods including natural mating. 
2. The composition of food products from cattle, swine, and goat clones, or the 
offspring of any animal clones, is no different from that of conventionally bred 
animals. 
3. Because of the preceding two conclusions, there are no additional risks to people 
eating food from cattle, swine, and goat clones or the offspring of any animal 
clones traditionally consumed as food.   




Section 4: Animal Cloning Questions 
 
Now, we would like to ask you several questions about cloning and government 
involvement in cloning.   
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? [response 
categories: 1=strongly disagree, 2= somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4= 
somewhat agree, 5=strongly agree; note: these items should ideally be randomly ordered 
across surveys]. 
 
17. Some of the meat currently sold in grocery stores is from cloned animals or 
their offspring. 
18. I am willing to eat meat from cloned animals. 
19. I am willing to eat meat from the offspring of cloned animals. 
20. I am willing to consume milk products from cloned animals. 
21. I am willing to consume milk products from the offspring of cloned animals. 
22. The U.S. government can trace the meat from cloned animals back to the farm 
on which the animal lived. 
23. The U.S. government is doing everything it can to ensure the safety of food 
products.  
24. In general, the meat and milk I buy from grocery stores is safe to eat 
25. The meat from cloned animals is safe to eat 
26. Animal cloning is carefully regulated by the U.S. government.   
27. The average American is willing to eat meat from cloned animals. 
28. Animal cloning is unacceptable. 
29. Animal cloning will result in beneficial outcomes to me. 
30. I trust the U.S. government to properly regulate the use of animal cloning. 
31. I trust information about cloning from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). 
32. I trust information about cloning from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). 
33. I trust information about cloning from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). 
34. I trust information about cloning from University scientist and researchers. 
35. If I learned that the meat products I regularly purchase came from cloned 
animals, I would continue to buy the meat products as usual. 
36. If I learned that the milk products I regularly purchase came from cloned 




We would not like to ask you how you would vote on three different policies were you 
given the opportunity to do so.  When answering each question, please assume that the 
particular policy in question is the only one on the ballot.  That is, please answer each of 
the next three questions individually assuming only one policy option was under 
consideration.   
 
37. Suppose the next time you went to vote, there was a referendum on the ballot 
that would require the U.S. government to implement a policy that required a 
tracking system on all cloned animals.  Would you vote in favor of this policy if 
the policy would increase the price you would pay for meat and milk products 
by X% due to the added enforcement and oversight required by the policy? 
[response categories: 1=I would vote in favor of a mandatory tracking system 
and a X% increase in the price of meat and milk; 2=I would vote against the 
mandatory tracking system and the X% increase in the price of meat and milk] 
[Note: the percentage price increase, X is to be randomly chosen for each 
individual among the values of 5, 10, 15, 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent.] 
 
38. Suppose the next time you went to vote, there was a referendum on the ballot 
that would require firms to place a label on all meat and milk products derived 
from cloned animals or the offspring of cloned animals.  Would you vote in 
favor of this policy if the policy would increase the price you would pay for 
meat and milk products by Y% due to the added enforcement and oversight 
required by the policy? [response categories: 1=I would vote in favor of a 
mandatory labeling policy on meat and milk from cloned animals and their 
offspring and a Y% increase in the price of meat and milk; 2=I would vote 
against the mandatory labeling policy and the Y% increase in the price of meat 
and milk] 
[Note: the percentage price increase, Y is to be randomly chosen for each 
individual among the values of 5, 10, 15, 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent.] 
 
39. Suppose the next time you went to vote, there was a referendum on the ballot 
that would ban the practice of animal cloning altogether.  Would you vote in 
favor of this policy if the policy would increase the price you would pay for 
meat and milk products by Z% due to the added enforcement and oversight 
required by the policy? [response categories: 1=I would vote in favor of a ban 
on cloned animals and a Z% increase in the price of meat and milk; 2=I would 
vote against a ban on cloned animals and the Z% increase in the price of meat 
and milk] 
[Note: the percentage price increase, Z is to be randomly chosen for each 
individual among the values of 5, 10, 15, 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent.  ] 
 





Some people are in favor of animal cloning and some people object to the practice.  We 
are interested in your opinions about a few of the objections that some people have about 
animal cloning.  For each of the following questions, please indicate which of the two 
statements best describes your views toward animal cloning.  We recognize that, in some 
cases, you may not particularly agree with either statement; however, please choose 
which of the two statements best matches your views. 
 
40. Which of the following two statements best describes your views toward animal 
cloning? X or Y 
[Ask 8 such questions, where the two statements X and Y are randomly chosen from the 
list of 8 issues below.  Note 1: in total, there are (8*8-8)/2=28 possible questions that that 
can be created representing all possible pairs of the issues listed below. Note 2: for data 
collection we will need to know which two statements were presented to the respondent 
and which choice was made for each of the 8 of the randomly selected questions for each 
individual.] 
Statements 
1. Animal cloning is morally wrong 
2. Meat and milk from clones and their offspring is unsafe to eat 
3. Animal cloning will lead to human cloning 
4. Cloning will result in unhealthy farm animals 
5. Cloning is “unnatural” because it is not a process that occurs in 
nature 
6. Cloning will reduce genetic diversity to an unacceptable level 
7. Cloning results in animals being viewed as “objects’ to be 
produced as opposed to being valuable in and of themselves 
8. The scientists and biotechnology companies who developed 




Which of the following two statements best describes your views toward animal cloning? 
“Animal cloning is morally wrong” or “Meat and milk from clones and their offspring is 
unsafe to eat.” [response categories: 1= Animal cloning is morally wrong,  2= Meat and 





Which of the following two statements best describes your views toward animal cloning? 
“Cloning will result in unhealthy farm animals” or “Animal cloning will lead to human 
cloning.” [response categories: 1= Cloning will result in unhealthy farm animals,  2= 
Animal cloning will lead to human cloning] 
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Now we will ask you several repeated questions about your preferences for ground beef 
with different characteristics.   
 
[Note: below are 12 choice-based conjoint questions, where the 3 ground beef 
characteristics are chosen from the levels shown below according to an experimental 
design.] 
i. Price per Pound 
1. $1.99/pound 
2. $3.99/pound 
ii. Percent Lean 
1. 80% 
2. 90% 






49.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 






Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound 
$3.99 $3.99 $1.99 
If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 
90% 90% 90% 
Saturated Fat Content 5% 10% 5% 




50.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 





51.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 




Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $1.99 $3.99 $1.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 90% 80% 80% 
Saturated Fat Content 10% 5% 5% 
I would choose . . . [] [] [] [] 
 
Characteristic 
Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $1.99 $3.99 $3.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 90% 90% 90% 
Saturated Fat Content 10% 10% 10% 




52.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 




53.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 





Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $3.99 $3.99 $3.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 80% 80% 90% 
Saturated Fat Content 5% 5% 10% 
I would choose . . . [] [] [] [] 
 
Characteristic 
Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $1.99 $1.99 $1.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 80% 80% 90% 
Saturated Fat Content 10% 10% 10% 




54.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 





55.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 




Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $3.99 $1.99 $3.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 90% 90% 80% 
Saturated Fat Content 10% 5% 10% 
I would choose . . . [] [] [] [] 
 
Characteristic 
Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $3.99 $3.99 $3.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 80% 80% 80% 
Saturated Fat Content 10% 10% 5% 




56.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 




57.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 




Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $3.99 $1.99 $1.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 90% 80% 80% 
Saturated Fat Content 5% 10% 10% 
I would choose . . . [] [] [] [] 
 
Characteristic 
Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $1.99 $3.99 $1.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 80% 90% 80% 
Saturated Fat Content 5% 5% 10% 




58.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 
purchase? (please check only one of the options below). 
 
Characteristic 
Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $1.99 $1.99 $3.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 90% 80% 90% 
Saturated Fat Content 5% 5% 5% 
I would choose . . . [] [] [] [] 
 
 
59.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 





Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $1.99 $1.99 $3.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 80% 90% 80% 
Saturated Fat Content 5% 10% 5% 





60.  Of the packages of ground beef shown below, which option would you choose to 
purchase? (please check only one of the options below). 
 
Characteristic 
Option A: Meat 
from non-
cloned animal 
Option B: Meat 
from cloned 
animal 





Price per pound $3.99 $1.99 $1.99 If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was 
available when 
shopping at my 
local grocery 
store, I would 
not purchase 
ground beef 
from this store 
Percent Lean 80% 90% 90% 
Saturated Fat Content 10% 5% 5% 




Now we will ask you several repeated questions about your preferences for milk with 
different characteristics.  Some of the milk products indicate that they were produced 
with rbST, which is a bovine growth hormone that increases milk production in cows. 
 
[Note: below are 16 choice-based conjoint questions, where the 3 ground beef 
characteristics are random chosen from the levels shown below.] 
iv. Price  
1. $2.99 
2. $5.99 





vi. rbST (bovine growth hormone that increases milk 
production in cows.) 




61.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 















animal Option D 
Fat Content Whole Whole Skim If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $5.99 $2.99 $2.99 
rbSt Use 
no rbSt used no rbSt used no rbSt used 




62.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 




63.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 















animal Option D 
Fat Content Whole Skim 1% If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $2.99 $2.99 $5.99 
rbSt Use 
rbSt used no rbSt used rbSt used 














animal Option D 
Fat Content 2% Skim Whole If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $2.99 $2.99 $2.99 
rbSt Use 
no rbSt used rbSt used no rbSt used 




64.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 
(please check only one of the options below). 
 
 
65.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 
















animal Option D 
Fat Content Skim Skim Skim If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $5.99 $5.99 $5.99 
rbSt Use 
rbSt used rbSt used no rbSt used 














animal Option D 
Fat Content Skim 2% 2% If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $2.99 $2.99 $5.99 
rbSt Use 
no rbSt used no rbSt used no rbSt used 




66.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 




67.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 
















animal Option D 
Fat Content Whole 2% Whole If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $5.99 $5.99 $5.99 
rbSt Use 
no rbSt used rbSt used rbSt used 














animal Option D 
Fat Content 2% Whole 2% If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $5.99 $2.99 $5.99 
rbSt Use 
rbSt used rbSt used rbSt used 




68.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 




69.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 
















animal Option D 
Fat Content Whole 1% 2% If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $2.99 $5.99 $2.99 
rbSt Use 
rbSt used rbSt used no rbSt used 














animal Option D 
Fat Content 2% 2% 1% If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $5.99 $5.99 $2.99 
rbSt Use 
rbSt used no rbSt used no rbSt used 




70.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 
(please check only one of the options below). 
 
 
71.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 
















animal Option D 
Fat Content Skim 1% 1% If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $5.99 $2.99 $2.99 
rbSt Use 
no rbSt used rbSt used rbSt used 














animal Option D 
Fat Content 1% Skim 2% If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $5.99 $5.99 $2.99 
rbSt Use 
no rbSt used no rbSt used rbSt used 




72.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 




73.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 
















animal Option D 
Fat Content 2% 1% Skim If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $2.99 $5.99 $5.99 
rbSt Use 
no rbSt used no rbSt used rbSt used 














animal Option D 
Fat Content 1% 2% Skim If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $2.99 $2.99 $2.99 
rbSt Use 
rbSt used rbSt used rbSt used 




74.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 




75.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 
















animal Option D 
Fat Content Skim Whole Whole If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $2.99 $5.99 $2.99 
rbSt Use 
rbSt used no rbSt used rbSt used 














animal Option D 
Fat Content 1% Whole 1% If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $2.99 $5.99 $5.99 
rbSt Use 
no rbSt used rbSt used no rbSt used 




76.  Of the fresh milk options shown below, which option would you choose to purchase? 
















animal Option D 
Fat Content 1% 1% Whole If options A, B, 
and C were all 
that was available 
when shopping at 
my local grocery 
store, I would not 
purchase milk 
from this store 
Price per Gallon $5.99 $2.99 $5.99 
rbSt Use 
rbSt used no rbSt used no rbSt used 




Section 5: Background Questions 
 
Finally, we would like to ask you some question about your background.  
 







Also, we would like to ask the following questions (if they are not already in the standard 
set of demographics)- we want to ask them in this manner to compare to some previous 
survey work we’ve done 
 








79. Approximately how often do you purchase meat, such as beef, pork, or poultry?  
7. Never 
8. A few times a year 
9. About once a month 
10. About once a week 
11. Every Day 
 
80. Approximately how often do you purchase milk? 
12. Never 
13. A few times a year 
14. About once a month 
15. About once a week 
16. Every Day 
 
81. Are there any children under the age of 12 in your household? 
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